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ABSTRACT
Mobile devices like smartphones and smartwatches are beginning to “stick” to
the human body. Given that these devices are equipped with a variety of sen-
sors, they are becoming a natural platform to understand various aspects of
human behavior. This dissertation will focus on just one dimension of hu-
man behavior, namely “location”. We will begin by discussing our research
on localizing humans in indoor environments, a problem that requires precise
tracking of human footsteps. We investigated the benefits of leveraging smart-
phone sensors (accelerometers, gyroscopes, magnetometers, etc.) into the in-
door localization framework, which breaks away from pure radio frequency
based localization (e.g., cellular, WiFi). Our research leveraged inherent prop-
erties of indoor environments to perform localization. We also designed ad-
ditional solutions, where computer vision was integrated with sensor fusion
to offer highly precise localization. We will close this thesis with micro-scale
tracking of the human wrist and demonstrate how motion data processing is
indeed a “double-edged sword”, offering unprecedented utility on one hand
while breaching privacy on the other.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In a matter of 10 years, from 2005 to 2015, the mobile phone has transformed
from a basic communication device to a smart device that performs sensing,
computing, and communications. Given that these smart devices are always
on and always with us, they are envisioned as a general-purpose human sen-
sor, capable of zooming into our daily lives and understanding our activities,
preferences, and behavioral patterns. The Silicon Valley has been calling this
the “quantified self” [1], essentially suggesting that the data from these devices
can be used for core inferences about ourselves, ultimately enabling a wide va-
riety of mobile sensing applications.
Many mobile sensing applications are already in the market. For example,
using accelerometer data from smartphones, it is possible to count the number
of steps the user has walked. Various calorie score applications have emerged
[2, 3, 4, 5]. Newer smartwatches have skin conduction sensors that read the
heart rate and enable various mobile health applications [2, 3, 4]. The Global
Positioning System (GPS) provides driving direction.
While these were initially innovative and important, now they are common.
The users of the next generation of applications have much higher expecta-
tions. If we need to deliver better applications for the future, research is nec-
essary to deliver efficient, practical inferencing techniques for humans. For in-
stance, finding a person’s indoor location, estimating the posture of a person,
tracking hand gestures, and various forms of context-awareness are four infer-
ences that are still difficult to assess today.
Our research focuses on developing inferencing techniques using multi-
modal sensor data on mobile devices such as smartphones and smartwatches,
with an emphasis on location sensing and tracking.
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In recent years, numerous location-based services have emerged in smart-
phone application stores. These location-based services significantly improve
people’s life quality. However, the vast majority of these services are only avail-
able for outdoor scenarios. This is mainly attributed to the comparative imma-
turity of indoor localization technology. While GPS has revolutionized outdoor
localization, it does not work indoors. Thus, indoor localization has been a tan-
talizing problem in mobile computing, and despite significant research, there is
no solution yet in the mainstream. Past work has explored signals from external
infrastructures (such as WiFi, sound, Bluetooth), however, installation, mainte-
nance, and periodic calibration needed in such infrastructure-based solutions
render them impractical.
Around 2007, motion sensors such as the accelerometer, gyroscope, and
compass, were integrated onto smartphones, which opened up the possibility
of using them for localization as opposed to relying on external infrastructures.
A few schemes have demonstrated the ability to compute the motion trajectory
of a mobile phone, using the phone’s speeds estimated from its accelerometer
and compass. The general idea is calculating one’s current location by using a
previous location, and advancing that position based upon estimated speeds
over time. This has been called dead-reckoning. Since the estimated speeds
are not alway correct, the dead-reckoned trajectories are accurate in the begin-
ning, but diverge from the correct trajectories over time. However, the accuracy
of dead-reckoning can be increased significantly by using reference points to
obtain fixes occasionally. For instance, in the past, stars were used as reference
points to guide pilots in dead-reckoning based air navigation systems.
Our research, UnLoc [6], an unsupervised indoor localization scheme,
identifies indoor reference points, uses these reference points to reset dead-
reckoning errors and provides highly accurate indoor localization. Our key
observation is that certain locations in an indoor environment present identi-
fiable signatures on one or more sensing dimensions. An elevator, for instance,
imposes a distinct pattern on a smartphone’s accelerometer; a specific spot
may experience an unusual magnetic fluctuation; a corridor-corner may over-
hear a unique set of WiFi access points. We hypothesize that these kinds of
signatures naturally exist in the environment, and can be envisioned as inter-
nal landmarks of a building. Mobile devices that “sense” these landmarks can
recalibrate their locations, while dead-reckoning schemes can track them be-
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tween landmarks. Translating this idea-sketch into a functional system entails
a variety of challenges such as (i) how to identify landmarks without human
supervision; (ii) how to automatically estimate landmark locations; (iii) how to
bootstrap the system without manual calibration effort; (iv) how to overcome the
impact of indoor magnetic fluctuation on walking direction estimation. UnLoc
systematically addressed these challenges and achieved a median localization
accuracy of 1.69 m. A video demonstration of UnLoc can be found in [7]. UnLoc
is discussed in Chapter 2.
UnLoc achieves a high median accuracy of 1.69 m without infrastructure and
calibration costs; however, the tail of the error distribution is long. In some ap-
plications, 99th percentile accuracy should be high and people are willing to
pay the expense for such accuracy. Therefore, we also studied solutions using
some infrastructures, VideoLoc, where feeds from surveillance cameras can be
leveraged for highly precise localization, without compromising the privacy of
individual users. While computer vision technologies can estimate a user’s lo-
cation from surveillance cameras, the key question in VideoLoc is how to send
the estimated location from the camera to the user’s smartphone. To enable
such communication, we need the user’s visual address. While the user’s face
could be one possible approach, the face may not be always visible. Our core
technique [8, 9] exploits the intuition that human motion patterns and cloth-
ing colors can together encode several bits of information. By treating this in-
formation as a “visual address”, it is feasible to enable communication between
a camera and a user, while allowing the user to turn off the “visual address” at
will. This core technique in VideoLoc can be extended to other applications
such as augmented reality. VideoLoc is discussed in Chapter 3.
Using rich sensors on mobile devices to track human location enables im-
portant applications. Such data is often a “double-edged sword” since it leaks
information about aspects of lives that are considered private. We looked into
the potential information leaks from micro-scale tracking of the human wrist
using wearable devices. Imagine a user typing on a laptop keyboard while wear-
ing a smartwatch. We asked whether motion sensors from the watch can leak
information about what the user is typing [10]. While it is not surprising that
some information will be leaked, the question is how much? We found that
when motion signal processing is combined with patterns in English language,
the leakage is substantial. Reported results showed that when a user types a
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word W that is longer than six characters, it is possible to shortlist 10 words on
average that will include W. The primary technical challenges are (i) tracking
micro motion of the smartwatch, and (ii) inferring the timing and location of
key-presses using (noisy) motion sensors. We addressed these challenges with
sensor fusion, signal processing and machine learning techniques. We named
our project MoLe, which stands for “motion leaks”. A brief video introduction
to MoLe can be found in [11]. MoLe is discussed in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 2
UNLOC: UNSUPERVISED INDOOR
LOCALIZATION
We propose UnLoc, an unsupervised indoor localization scheme that bypasses
the need for war-driving. Our key observation is that certain locations in an
indoor environment present identifiable signatures on one or more sensing
dimensions. An elevator, for instance, imposes a distinct pattern on a smart-
phone’s accelerometer; a corridor-corner may overhear a unique set of WiFi
access points; a specific spot may experience an unusual magnetic fluctuation.
We hypothesize that these kinds of signatures naturally exist in the environ-
ment, and can be envisioned as internal landmarks of a building. Mobile de-
vices that “sense” these landmarks can recalibrate their locations, while dead-
reckoning schemes can track them between landmarks. Results from three dif-
ferent indoor settings, including a shopping mall, demonstrate median loca-
tion errors of 1.69 m. War-driving is not necessary, neither are floorplans – the
system simultaneously computes the locations of users and landmarks, in a
manner that they converge reasonably quickly. We believe this is an unconven-
tional approach to indoor localization, holding promise for real-world deploy-
ment. This chapter is published in MobiSys 2012 [6].
2.1 Introduction
Despite innovative research [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26], indoor localization is still not in the mainstream. In trying to trace
the reasons, we distilled two main messages: (1) Indoor spaces require fairly
high location accuracy because the contexts vary at finer spatial granular-
ity. For instance, a 5 m location error outdoors may still indicate the same
street, but 5 m indoors may mean two different aisles in a grocery store. An
inventory-management application may very well require aisle-level precision.
(2) While such precision is attainable with pervasive WiFi systems, they come at
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a prohibitively high cost, mostly in the form of meticulous (signal) calibration.
Such calibration is not necessarily a one-time cost since RF fingerprints could
change, perhaps due to changes in layout and objects in the environment.
Attempts to simplify the calibration process have been successful, but at the
expense of reduced location accuracy. This zero sum game between accuracy
and calibration overhead has been an important hurdle to deploying indoor
localization systems. This chapter is tasked to break away from this tradeoff,
and achieve meter level accuracy with zero calibration. Although a high bar, we
believe this is feasible and pursue this goal.
Our scheme cuts across isolated ideas in mobile computing. We introduce
these ideas first, and then describe the value in making them compatible.
• A few recent schemes have demonstrated the ability to compute the mo-
tion trajectory of a mobile phone, using its accelerometer and compasses
[13, 27]. This has been called urban dead-reckoning. Due to noise in the
mobile sensors, the dead-reckoned trajectories are accurate in the be-
ginning, but diverge from the correct trajectories over time. Therefore,
outdoor localization schemes like CompAcc [13] have triggered periodic
GPS measurements to recalibrate the user’s location. Unfortunately, GPS
is unreliable indoors, rendering dead-reckoning based approaches use-
less. Nonetheless, if one can identify other means of recalibration, dead-
reckoning could be applicable even indoors.
• Urban sensing and activity recognition literature have demonstrated the
ability to recognize ambiences and user behavior. For instance, inertial
sensors can detect when a user is walking, turning into a corridor, or
climbing up the stairs [28]; microphones and magnetometers can detect
ambient sounds and magnetic fluctuations [25, 29]. While these signa-
tures have been primarily used for various forms of context-awareness,
they lend themselves to localization as well. For example, these signa-
tures can be treated as “landmarks”, useful to recalibrate indoor dead-
reckoning.
• Past work has mostly relied on signal calibration [12, 14] to develop WiFi-
based localization. We observe that WiFi can be valuable even without
calibration. For instance, one can use overheard WiFi APs to partition an
indoor space into smaller sub-spaces. Thus, a landmark signature need
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not be unique in the entire building – so long as it is unique within a WiFi
sub-space, it can be recognized without ambiguity.
UnLoc combines these three ideas (dead-reckoning, urban sensing, and
WiFi-based partitioning) into a framework for unsupervised localization. The
core idea is recursive but not complicated. Briefly, mobile users move naturally
in the building collecting accelerometer, compass, gyroscope, and WiFi read-
ings. By assimilating data from these devices, UnLoc detects sensory signatures
(e.g., a corridor turn) that are unique within their respective WiFi sub-spaces.
Now using the same collected data, UnLoc dead-reckons the devices starting
from a known reference location, say the entrance of the building. Since dead-
reckoning provides a rough location to the phone, it is also possible to roughly
localize the signatures based on when the phone senses them.
Now, the locations of these signatures – also called landmarks – can be made
more accurate by combining the rough estimates from multiple phones. These
landmarks can then be used to improve the dead-reckoning of subsequent
phones, which in turn can refine the landmark locations. This recursive pro-
cess continues to improve localization accuracy over time. Observe that the
system does not need calibration – the first few users may experience inferior
location accuracy, but a little more data brings the system to convergence.
Of course, translating this idea-sketch into a functional system entails a va-
riety of challenges: (1) Dead-reckoning is non-trivial in indoor environments
where metals and electrical equipment significantly affect the compass bear-
ing.1 (2) Extracting the accurate location of the landmarks from multiple er-
roneous locations is problematic, since all the errors may not be equal. Some
notion of confidence on the errors needs to be built, so that the estimates can
be suitably weighted before combination. (3) Identifying landmark signatures
from the sensed data warrants unsupervised learning on sensor features. (4)
Finally, the system needs to be optimized for energy, to avoid a significant bat-
tery drain during localization. This chapter addresses these challenges one step
at a time, prototypes on a testbed of Android Nexus series phones, and evalu-
ates with three volunteers naturally walking in two university buildings and one
shopping mall. Performance results show median localization accuracy of 1.69
m when UnLoc runs online, and 0.89 m when the locations are computed of-
1Prior work demonstrated dead-reckoning mostly for outdoor environments.
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fline. The system quickly reaches convergence in less than two man-hours, and
remains robust to dynamic changes in the environment. We believe this could
be a promising direction, and with rigorous testing and tuning, a potential can-
didate for the real world.
Our main contributions may be summarized as follows:
• We identify an opportunity to simultaneously harness sensor-based
dead-reckoning and environment sensing for localization. Our ap-
proach does not require calibration or installation of additional infras-
tructure.
• We design a practical scheme that employs unsupervised learning to
extract unique sensor signatures – called landmarks. We show that ade-
quate landmarks exist inside buildings such that dead-reckoning is prac-
tical and reasonably accurate.
• We develop UnLoc on the Android OS, and evaluate across three differ-
ent indoor spaces, including the North Gate shopping mall in Durham.
We achieved less than 2 m error without any pre-deployment effort; in
fact, we used the map of the building only to compute the ground truth
for evaluation.
The subsequent sections expand on each of these contributions, beginning
with an architectural overview and intuition, followed by measurement, design,
and evaluation.
2.2 Architecture and Intuition
We begin with a high-level overview of UnLoc, focusing mainly on the core
building blocks and intuitions (Figure 2.1). We will postpone the discussion
on actual algorithms and engineering details to Section 2.3. In fact, we will
even make a simplifying assumption that the building floorplan is available to
UnLoc.
Of course, this assumption need not hold in our final system – its sole pur-
pose is ease of explanation. Once we have developed the core framework, we
will discuss how the assumption can be relaxed.
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Human Motion Traces Consider the example where we intend to localize
users in a shopping mall. When users visit the mall, the UnLoc app running
on their smartphones collects time-stamped sensor readings. These readings
(mainly from accelerometer, compass, gyroscope, and WiFi APs2) are assim-
ilated in a central repository. UnLoc must operate on this data to track each
user’s location. For now, we perform this offline.
Seed Landmarks (SLMs) As a first step, UnLoc looks into the floorplan of the
building and identifies some “seed landmarks”. These seed landmarks are es-
sentially certain structures in the building – stairs, elevators, entrances, esca-
lators – that force users to behave in predictable ways. These predictable be-
haviors can be translated to sensor signatures. For instance, building entrances
are characterized by a visible drop in the GPS confidence when the user moves
from outdoors to indoors; elevators exhibit a distinct accelerometer signature,
emerging from the start and stop of the elevator. If a user, Alice, used the el-
evator in the mall, UnLoc expects her trace to contain the elevator signature
embedded in it. Let us assume that this signature occurs in Alice’s trace at time
ti . Since the location of the elevator is known within the floorplan, UnLoc can
precisely localize Alice at ti . In similar ways, Alice can be precisely localized at
other time-points when she passed through any of the other landmarks. The
next step, then, is to localize her while she moved between these landmarks –
for this, UnLoc adopts techniques from urban dead-reckoning.
Dead-Reckoning Urban dead-reckoning [13] is an established idea that uses
the accelerometer and the compass to track a mobile user. The key idea is sim-
ple. Based on the accelerometer readings of the mobile phone, it is possible to
count the number of steps a person has walked, and from there derive the dis-
placement of the person. Based on the compass, the direction of each of these
steps can be tracked.3 Merging these, the <displacement, direction, time> tu-
ple forms the human’s motion vector. Pivoting these vectors at the seed land-
marks, UnLoc tracks the location of Alice. Although the tracking operation is
crude (because the noisy sensors accumulate error over time), the error gets
reset whenever Alice crosses any of the landmarks. Thus, in the steady state,
2Sound and light measurements could also be useful, but we do not activate them for energy-
efficiency.
3However, as shown in Section 2.2.1, magnetic fluctuations in the environment will derail
the compass readings, forcing us to shift to gyroscopes.
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Alice’s localization error exhibits a saw-tooth behavior – over time, the localiza-
tion error grows and then sharply drops to zero at the landmark, and then grows
again. Observe that increasing the density of landmarks will cause the error to
reset frequently, thereby curbing the error growth. UnLoc will attempt to ac-
complish this by organically extracting additional landmarks from the indoor
environment.
Organic Landmarks (OLMs) In addition to seed landmarks, UnLoc postulates
that any indoor environment will offer some ambient signatures across one or
many sensing dimensions. These signatures can be in the magnetic domain,
wherein metals in a specific location may produce unique and reproducible
fluctuations on the user’s magnetometer, near that location. Signatures could
also be WiFi-based – a spot may overhear a set of WiFi base stations, but the
set may change at short distances away from that spot. A few (dead) spots in-
side a building may not overhear any WiFi or GSM/3G signals, which by itself
is a signature. Further, even a water-fountain could be a signature – users who
stop to drink water may exhibit some common patterns on the accelerometer
and magnetometer domains. Whenever these pattern surface on Alice’s trace,
it could be an opportunity to recognize her location. Of course, even though
these signatures can become useful landmarks, they cannot be known a priori,
and will vary across different buildings. They have to be learned dynamically.
Toward learning these landmarks, UnLoc subjects the sensor data (gathered
from all phones) to a clustering algorithm (Figure 2.1). Actually, various fea-
tures of this data are extracted and the clustering runs on this high-dimensional
space – detailed in Section 2.3. Once the clustering operation has completed,
each of the resulting clusters is expected to contain similar sensor patterns.
Now, since each sensor reading is associated with time-stamps, it is possible to
find their corresponding locations via dead-reckoning. UnLoc computes these
locations to check whether all members of a cluster fall within a small area as
shown in Figure 2.2. If they do, then UnLoc deems it a new landmark. Since
these landmarks were discovered automatically, without any external supervi-
sion, we call them organic landmarks (OLMs). If no OLMs are found, UnLoc
waits for more traces and continues scanning for OLMs.
10
Simultaneous Localization and Mapping Both SLMs and newly discovered
OLMs are used to improve dead-reckoning for subsequent users, which in turn
improves the location estimates of the SLMs/OLMs themselves. This circular
process pushes the entire system to better accuracy and UnLoc continues to
improve over time. Section 2.4 will quantify this behavior for different users
and buildings.
2.2.1 Intuition and Supporting Measurements
The success of UnLoc hinges on at least three performance-related expecta-
tions: (1) Dead-reckoning can attain desired levels of accuracy, if periodically
recalibrated by landmarks. (2) Indoor environments indeed offer the requisite
number of landmarks. (3) The locations of the landmarks can be computed
from rough estimates of multiple devices (i.e., the dead-reckoning errors are
indeed independent). We discuss our intuition in each of these, and present
supporting measurements.
2.2.1.1 Dead-Reckoning Accuracy
We performed some initial experiments in the computer engineering building
at Duke University. Volunteers were asked to carry NexusS phones in their
pockets, and walk naturally in one wing of the building. The UnLoc app run-
ning on the phones records the accelerometer and compass readings, and
extracts from them the <displacement, direction, time> tuples. To record
ground truth, we marked different doors and windows in the buildings with
a distinct number4 – when a user passed by that number, the user entered it
into the user’s phone. Since we know the mapping between the number and
the door/window, we are able to extract the ground truth (almost accurately).
We gathered 10 traces, each starting from the entrance of the building. We
performed trace-based analysis to understand how the dead-reckoned path
diverges from the true path, with varying number of landmarks.
Figure 2.3 shows the accumulated error over time (light gray curve) when
using pure dead-reckoning with zero landmarks. Evidently, the error accu-
mulates dramatically fast, and is completely unusable. Hence, we simulate
4Recall that GPS is unavailable indoors.
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landmarks by periodically reseting the user’s location to the correct location
– the black curve shows the results. While the performance improves, the
mean localization error is still 11.7 m, greater than our target. On analyzing the
data, we observed that the magnetic field in indoor environments is heavily
distorted by metallic and electrical equipments in the (engineering) building.
Thus, although these magnetic fluctuations are beneficial for finding land-
marks, they derail dead-reckoning by injecting heavy error in the compass.
UnLoc appeared impractical at this point.
Fortunately, newer smartphones are embedded with gyroscopes that mea-
sure the angular velocity of the phone in three dimensions and are not affected
by the magnetic field. We carefully processed the gyroscope readings to com-
pute the angular changes during walking, i.e., how the user turned. However,
gyroscope readings are relative and we needed to combine it opportunistically
with the compass to estimate the user’s absolute walking direction. We will
report several technical challenges of this operation in Section 2.3, including
compass offsets and gyroscope drifts. However, once we harnessed the gyro-
scope and the compass in tandem, the dead-reckoning error reduced appre-
ciably (blue curve in Figure 2.3). When re-calibrated by periodic landmarks,
the average error dropped further to 1.2 m, offering us confidence to build a
fuller system.
In addition, once a landmark is encountered, the user’s path can be retraced
and corrected between the last two landmarks. Although this does not help in
real-time tracking of the user, it helps in offline analysis, and more importantly,
for improving the location estimate of organic landmarks.
2.2.1.2 Landmark Density
It is natural to question why indoor environments would exhibit sensor signa-
tures to be used as landmarks. While there is no guarantee, our observation is
that an indoor environment is rich with ambient signals, like sound, light, mag-
netic field, temperature, WiFi, 3G, etc. Moreover, different building structures
(e.g., stairs, doors, elevators) force humans to behave in specific ways. If one
“combs” through all these sensor signals and their high-dimensional combina-
tions, we postulate that some signatures are likely to emerge. The intuition is
essentially rooted in diversity, i.e., the chances that all of the signals are similar
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and no pattern “shows up as different”, seems unlikely. Further, these signa-
tures need not be unique in the entire building – so long as they are unique
within the WiFi sub-space, they can be valid landmarks. We performed a small
scale measurement study to verify this intuition. The results follow.
WiFi Landmarks Consider an area within which all locations overhear a dis-
tinct set of WiFi APs. An indoor space is likely to have many such areas of vary-
ing sizes. Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of the sizes of these areas. While
most of the areas are quite large – explaining why simple WiFi-based localiza-
tion is not very accurate – there are a few areas (at the left side of the X-axis)
that are very small. UnLoc aims to exploit these small areas as a landmark. If
one of these small areas overhears a set of WiFi APs, denoted W , then a mobile
phone overhearing the same set can be assumed to be within that area. Since
the area is small, the localization error of the phone will be small too, enabling
a location recalibration. Our measurements show that in two floors of the engi-
neering building, we find eight and five such WiFi landmarks, each of area less
than 4 m2. Thus WiFi APs can offer landmarks to enhance dead-reckoning.
Magnetic/Accelerometer Landmarks In search of signatures in other sens-
ing domains, we executed K-means clustering on accelerometer and compass
measurements (we present the algorithm and parameter details in Section 2.3).
For each cluster, we mapped their members to their corresponding physical
locations (using ground truth). For most clusters, we found that their member-
locations were widely scattered in space, and hence, were unusable as a land-
mark. However, members of a few clusters proved to be tightly collocated in
space as well. For example, we discovered a unique/stable magnetic fluctua-
tion near our networking lab. We found another spot with a distinct accelerom-
eter signature – a pair of symmetric bumps in opposite directions (Figure 2.5).
Although UnLoc need not understand the semantic meaning of these sig-
natures, out of curiosity we analyzed the data, and discovered that they were
caused by the elevator starting and stopping. In fact, the direction of the bumps
(upward or downward) even indicated whether the user went upstairs or down-
stairs. These spatially collocated patterns were natural landmarks, and when
we assimilated all sensing dimensions, the number of landmarks proved to be
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six and eight for each floor. In fact, when we combined accelerometer and com-
pass together to create a higher-dimensional signature, we found even more
landmarks due to turns in the building. In sum, the organic and seed landmarks
together seemed to offer the needed density to support indoor dead-reckoning.
2.2.1.3 Computing Landmark Locations
Perhaps an important pitfall in UnLoc lies in computing the locations of the
landmarks. Figure 2.6(a) is intended to explain the problem. In this exam-
ple, assume that UnLoc has combined the user’s sensor data, clustered on the
data points, and discovered three sensor signatures (in distinct WiFi areas), that
can be used as landmarks. Now the locations of these landmarks need to be
computed, but there is no ground truth to learn that information. One way
to estimate the location of a landmark is to use dead-reckoning, but the result
will not be accurate since dead-reckoning itself is erroneous. Our approach is
to compute the landmark location by combining all the (dead-reckoned) esti-
mates of a given landmark. The intuition is that dead-reckoning errors have
been observed to be random and independent, due to the noise in hardware
sensors and human step sizes [13]. By combining these errors from adequate
measurements, one could expect the estimated mean to converge to the actual
landmark location. Figure 2.6(b) illustrates the opportunity through a simple
centroid calculation.
Figure 2.7 visualizes data from real measurements to verify independence in
dead-reckoning error in which each line joins the estimated landmark location
to the actual location. Visually, the errors appear uncorrelated. Of course, this is
a preliminary overview of the inner workings of the system. We later discuss the
algorithmic details of this error combining process, and measure performance
in greater detail.
2.3 Design Details
This section describes the algorithms and engineering details underlying Un-
Loc.
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2.3.1 Seed Landmarks
If the building’s floorplan is known (which is often necessary to visualize the
user’s location), then UnLoc can infer the locations of doors, elevators, stair-
cases, escalators, etc. This implies that the location of seed landmarks (SLMs)
are immediately known. As long as the smartphone can detect these SLMs
while passing through them, it can recalibrate its location. Thus, the goal of
the SLM detection module is to define sensor patterns that are global across all
buildings.
2.3.1.1 Elevators, Staircases, and Escalators
This class of SLMs is based on using the inertial sensors. These sensors have
the advantage of being ubiquitously installed on a large class of smartphones,
have a low-energy footprint, and are always turned on during the phone oper-
ation (to detect the change of screen orientation). We focus on three particular
examples that are common in indoor environments: elevators, escalators, and
stairs. Figure 2.8 shows a classification tree for detecting the three classes of
interest and separating them from walking and being stationary. We note that a
false positive leads to errors in estimating the location of the SLM while a false
negative leads to missing an opportunity for recalibration. Therefore, high de-
tection accuracy with low false positive/negative rates are highly desired.
Elevator A typical elevator usage trace consists of a normal walking period,
followed by waiting for the elevator for some time, walking into the elevator,
standing inside for a short time, an over-weight/weightloss occurs (depending
on the direction of the elevator), then a stationary period which depends on
the number of the floors the elevator moved, another weight-loss/over-weight,
and finally a walk-out. To recognize the elevator motion pattern, we developed
a Finite State Machine (FSM) that depends on the observed state transitions.
Different thresholds are used to move between the states. Evaluation over 22
traces shows that the thresholds are robust to changes in the environment and
can achieve 0.6% and 0% false positive and negative rates, respectively.
Escalator Once the elevator has been separated, it is easy to separate the
classes with constant velocity (escalator and stationary) from the other classes
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(walking and stairs) using the variance of acceleration. Now, to separate the
escalator from stationarity, we found that the variance of the magnetic field
can be a reliable discriminator. Of course, a user may sometimes climb up the
escalator – we find that magnetic variance also differentiates between this and
an actual staircase-climb (see Figure 2.9).
Stairs Once the scenario with constant speed is separated, we need to differ-
entiate between the stair and walking cases. The main observation here is that
when the user is using the stairs, the user’s speed increases or decreases based
on whether the gravity is helping the user or not. This creates a higher correla-
tion between the acceleration in the direction of motion and direction of gravity
as compared to walking. As reported in Section 2.4, staircases can sometimes
lead to false negatives (1.8%).
2.3.2 Dead-Reckoning
The two sub-tasks in dead-reckoning are (1) computing the user’s displacement
from the accelerometer and (2) continuously tracking the direction of move-
ment.
2.3.2.1 Displacement from Accelerometer
One possible solution is to double-integrate the accelerometer readings. Fig-
ure 2.10(b) shows the unacceptable results, that is, the difference between the
estimated and actual displacement reaches more than 100 m only after 30 m of
actual displacement. This is an attribute of a noisy accelerometer, low sampling
rate (24 Hz), as well as jerky movements of the phone when carried by the user.
A better approach [13, 30] is to identify a human-walking signature as in Figure
2.10(a). This signature arises from the natural up/down bounce of the human
body for each step taken. To capture this, we pass the signal through a low pass
filter, and identify two consecutive local minima. Between these local minima,
we search for a local maxima, and check whether the difference between the
maxima and minima is greater than a threshold. If so, we increment the step
count.
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The physical displacement can be computed by multiplying the step count
with the user’s step size, a function of the user’s weight and height [31].5 Em-
ploying a fixed step size across all users can clearly be erroneous. However, Un-
Loc has the opportunity to infer the step size by counting the number of steps
for a known displacement (i.e., between two landmarks). Figure 2.10(c) shows
the error accumulated by UnLoc using these techniques in place – the results
are encouraging. The step count accuracy (verified with 10 users) was also 98%.
2.3.2.2 Orientation Using Compass/Gyroscope
Past work has demonstrated the feasibility of dead-reckoning using the smart-
phone compass. However, to the best of our knowledge, all these results are
for outdoor environments. Indoors, the magnetic field due to ferromagnetic
material and electrical objects in the vicinity, completely derailed our dead-
reckoning attempts.6 In response to this, we explored the feasibility of using a
gyroscope to infer the user’s movement directions. Our intuition was that the
gyroscope is decoupled from the magnetometer sensor, and hence, could be
insensitive to ambient magnetic fields.
While this insensitivity proved true, i.e., the gyroscope indeed remained un-
affected by changing magnetic fields, the tradeoff was that the gyroscope of-
fered relative angular velocity. This is in the form of a 3D rotation matrix which
when multiplied by a time interval, yields the relative angular displacement
(RAD) of the device. Unfortunately, the RAD is with respect to a direction that is
not necessarily the absolute direction. Thus, while we could track the structure
of the user’s motion path using the gyroscope, these paths were biased by the
error in their initial direction. Thus all the estimated paths appeared as rotated
versions of the true path, shown in Figure 2.11(a).
We observe that encountering landmarks can help infer this bias. Fig-
ure 2.11(b) explains the opportunity. Consider a user encountering a known
landmark L1 at time t1, and later another landmark L2 at time t2. UnLoc iden-
tifies that the user encountered these two landmarks because the signatures
matched, and hence, regardless of the dead-reckoned estimates, UnLoc “pins
down” the user’s path at these locations. Now, let θ denote the angle between
5A more accurate approach is to estimate the user step size based on the user’s gait [32].
6We attempted at least five different techniques to learn and correct for these fluctuations.
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the line joining L1,L2 and the line joining L1, X2, where X2 is the dead-reckoned
estimate at time t2. We observe that θ is the initial bias, and therefore, UnLoc
rotates the entire motion segment by θ. Importantly, the same θ can be used
to track the user for the subsequent motion segment – say until the user en-
counters landmark L3 – at which point the bias can again be updated. This
process of learning and updating the bias at every landmark leads to stable
and consistent results. The only remaining problem lies in tracking the user
until the second landmark is encountered, and during this phase, the user’s
dead-reckoning error can be arbitrarily high.
UnLoc turns to the compass during the initial phase when the gyroscope bias
is still unknown. Clearly, the compass value cannot be used blindly – ambient
magnetic field fluctuations can actually degrade the results. Thus, UnLoc juxta-
poses the gyroscope and compass readings, shown in Figure 2.12(a), and when-
ever the trends are correlated, the compass value is selected as the direction of
motion. The gyroscope’s bias is now inferred, and used thereafter. The intuition
here is that correlated trends in the compass and gyroscope are an indicator of
proper compass readings; and if the compass is not reflecting the gyroscope’s
trend, it is probably affected by other factors. Figure 2.12(b) shows the eventual
outcomes in an angular direction estimation. The compass helps with the ini-
tial phase, while the gyroscope-based dead-reckoning proves to be effective. In
fact, to the best of our knowledge, UnLoc is the first system to leverage smart-
phone gyroscopes for indoor dead-reckoning.
2.3.3 Organic Landmarks
The task of discovering organic landmarks (OLMs) is rooted in (1) recogniz-
ing distinct patterns from many sensed signals, (2) and testing whether a given
pattern is spatially confined to a small area. Recall that Figure 2.2 illustrates
the flow of operations. All the sensor readings are gathered in a matrix: ele-
ment < i , j > of the matrix contains sensor readings from phone i at time j .
These sensor readings are essentially features of the raw sensed values (from
the accelerometer, compass, gyroscope, magnetometer, and WiFi). Features
for the magnetic and inertial sensors include mean, max, min, variance, mean-
crossings, while for WiFi, they are MAC ID, RSSI.
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UnLoc normalizes these features between [−1,1] and feeds them to a K −
means clustering algorithm. (We tested with Expectation Maximization (EM)
clustering as well, but it was not consistently better than K-means.) The cluster-
ing is executed for each individual sensing dimensions, as well as their combi-
nations (such as accelerometer and compass together). Figure 2.13, for exam-
ple, shows the clusters from the magnetometer readings for K = 3. We varied
the value of K and recorded the clusters in each case. Our goal is to identify
clusters that have low similarity with all other clusters; this will suggest a good
signature. For this, we compute the correlation between a given cluster and all
other clusters. If the maximum correlation is less than a similarity threshold,
we consider this cluster as a candidate for a landmark.
To qualify as an OLM, the candidate cluster must also be confined to a small
geographical area. For this, we first test whether the members of a cluster are
within the same WiFi area (i.e., they overhear the same WiFi APs). While this is
necessary, it is not sufficient because many WiFi areas are large. Therefore, for
clusters within a WiFi area, we compute the dead-reckoned locations for each
of their members. If locations of all cluster-members are indeed within a small
area – we use 4 m2 – then we recruit this cluster as an OLM. As an anecdote, we
found that using the accelerometer, one of the sensor clusters was scattered all
over the indoor space. Upon investigation, we detected that this cluster roughly
captured walking patterns. On the other hand, another cluster that proved to
be within the 4 m2 area was from a magnetic signature near an electrical service
room in the building. UnLoc announces the centroid of the cluster as the OLM’s
location.
While the above describes the generalized version of the OLM detection algo-
rithm, the different sensing dimensions require some customization, discussed
next.
2.3.3.1 WiFi Landmarks
We use MAC addresses of WiFi APs and their corresponding RSSI values as fea-
tures. To remain robust to signal variations (which alters the set of overheard
APs), we only consider APs that are stronger than a threshold RSSI. Now, apply-
ing K-means clustering, we identify small areas (4 m2) that have low similarity
with all locations outside that area. We compute the similarity of two locations,
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l1 and l2, as follows. Let us denote the sets of WiFi APs overheard at locations l1
and l2 as A1 and A2, respectively. Also, let A = A1U A2. Let fi (a) denote the RSSI
of AP a, a ∈ A, overheard at location li ; if a is not overheard at li , then fi (a)= 0.
We now define similarity S ∈ [0,1], between locations l1 and l2 as:
S = 1|A|
∑
∀a∈A
mi n( f1(a), f2(a))
max( f1(a), f2(a))
The rationale for this equation is to add proportionally large weights to S
when an AP’s signals are similarly strong at both locations, and vice versa. We
threshold on S to define a WiFi landmark. We choose a threshold of 0.4 in our
system, indicating that all locations within the WiFi landmark need to exhibit
less than 0.4 similarity with any other location outside the landmark. Of course,
this rather strict threshold ensures that landmarks are quite distinct, but also re-
duces the number of possible landmarks. Figure 2.14 shows this tradeoff using
traces from two Duke University buildings. We observed that 0.4 was a reason-
able cut-off point, balancing quality and quantity of WiFi OLMs.
2.3.3.2 Magnetic and Inertial Sensor Landmarks
Indoor environments are characterized by at least a few turns (at the end of cor-
ridors, into offices, classrooms, stairs, etc.). Since the gyroscope offers reliable
angular displacements, we recognize the opportunity to use them as organic
landmarks. We design a special feature called the bending coefficient. Essen-
tially, the coefficient captures the notion of path curvature, computed as the
length of the perpendicular from the center of a walking segment to the straight
line joining the end-points of the segment. We compute the bending coefficient
over a sliding window on the user’s walking path, and use them as a separate
feature. Later, when we cluster on the bending coefficient and WiFi together as
features, similar turns within a WiFi area gather in the same cluster. The turns
in the cluster could still be doors of adjacent classrooms in a corridor – these
turns may very well lie within the same WiFi area. To avoid coalescing all these
turns into the same landmark, UnLoc checks if the cluster is confined to within
a 4 m2 area; only then is the cluster declared a landmark.
Magnetic landmarks are also derived through similar techniques. So long as
the magnetic signature is unique within one WiFi area, and the sensed locations
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are spatially confined within 4 m2, we deem it as a magnetic OLM. Figure 2.15
shows an anecdotal example where the magnetic field near our networking lab
demonstrates a unique distortion.
2.3.4 Simultaneous Localization and Mapping
UnLoc uses the SLMs and OLMs to reset dead-reckoning error and track the
user. The improved dead-reckoned paths help in refining the landmark lo-
cations because different paths offer independently erroneous estimates of a
specific landmark. Combining these independent errors produces the refine-
ment (the intuition derived from the law of large numbers, where the sampled
mean converges to the true mean for a large number of samples). We combine
the estimates of a landmark, say Li , as follows. While the obvious approach
would be to compute the centroid, we actually take advantage of the observa-
tion that all estimated locations may not be equally incorrect. Consider two
users who arrive at Li from landmarks L j and Lk , respectively. If L j is closer to
Li than Lk , then the user who walks from L j is likely to have incurred less error.
This is because pure dead-reckoning is known to accumulate error over time.
Thus, accounting for this confidence in landmark estimates, UnLoc computes
a weighted centroid. The result is declared as the location of the landmark.
2.3.5 Points of Discussion
While we assumed the knowledge of a floorplan, we can relax that assumption
now. Observe that in reality, we need just one ground truth location of any seed
landmark. This could be the location of the building’s entrance, staircase, ele-
vator. Once we know the GPS coordinate of one SLM, the rest of the SLMs and
OLMs can be organically grown, using this known coordinate as the origin. Im-
portantly, the location of this origin SLM – say the building’s entrance – needs
to be learned only once when UnLoc bootstraps for the first time. In the steady
state, even if users do not know when they are passing through the entrance,
their locations will become known once they encounter a landmark. The same
is true when a user enters through a different entrance of the building, or the
user turns on the phone at some time once inside the building. The localization
service will activate once the users pass through the first landmark.
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In this chapter’s implementation, we extracted the GPS location of the build-
ing entrance from Google Satellite View. During bootstrap, a user activated Un-
Loc when entering through this entrance. Alternatively, the entrance location
could have been collected by other means, or even estimated from locations
where GPS fixes are lost (after entering a building). We firmly believe that ob-
taining the GPS coordinate of one SLM, just one time, will not be difficult in real
life.
Activity-based landmarks are feasible too – a busy cafe may invariably have a
queue, or visiting a restroom may have a unique signature. These activities can
very well be landmarks as long as their patterns surface upon clustering. Even
temporary landmarks can be learned (i.e., queue exists between noon and 2:00
pm only), and even unlearned if the queueing behavior disappears during, say,
winter vacations. Our current implementation has not explored these oppor-
tunities; we have only used signatures that are stable over time.
The early adopters of UnLoc will help with localizing the OLMs and bring the
system to convergence – is this not war-driving? We argue that this is certainly
not war-driving because the early adopters behave naturally and do not col-
lect ground truth (since they do not need GPS). In fact, they collect exactly the
same sensor readings as all other users. The only difference is that the early
users may experience less localization accuracy. The process of war-driving, on
the contrary, is associated with the notion of (ground truth) calibration, which
naturally requires additional equipment.
The next section discusses the implementation, experiment methodology,
and performance of UnLoc.
2.4 Evaluation
2.4.1 Prototype Implementation
UnLoc is implemented on Google NexusS phones using JAVA as the program-
ming platform. The phone samples the four sensors (magnetometer, compass,
and accelerometer at 24 Hz; gyroscope at highest permissible rate) and WiFi at
1 Hz. Various features derived from these measurements are sent to the UnLoc
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server.7 The server side code is written using C# and MATLAB, and implements
the dead-reckoning, clustering, and landmark signature-matching algorithms.
Whenever a new landmark is detected from clustering, the server updates the
OLM list.
2.4.2 Methodology
We design real-life experiments with three different users in three different uni-
versity buildings – (1) computer science (2) engineering, and (3) a shopping
mall. Approximately, we covered 1750 m2, 3000 m2, and 4000 m2 respectively,
in these buildings. Each user walked around arbitrarily in the building for 1.5
hours, covering multiple floors; each carried two phones, one in the pocket and
another in the hand with the screen facing up. We made separate arrangements
to collect ground truth (recall that GPS is not available inside any of these build-
ings). Briefly, we pasted markers on the grounds at precisely known locations,
such as the center of a classroom door, the first step in a staircase, the entry-
point to the elevator, in front of a window, etc. Each of these markers had a
number on it; as a user walked through a marker, the user spoke out the num-
ber on the marker, and the phone recorded it. By superimposing the map of
the building on Google Earth, and identifying the corresponding locations of
the markers, we extracted their GPS locations. This offered us ground truth at
these markers. Between two markers (separate by 5 m on average), we inter-
polated using step count. Of course, UnLoc did not rely on any of the ground
truth markers to compute its location. Thus, at any given time, the difference
between ground truth and the UnLoc-estimated location, is UnLoc’s instanta-
neous localization error.
2.4.3 Evaluation Results
We intend to concentrate on the following questions:
• How many landmarks are detected in different buildings? Are they well
scattered? (Figure 2.16)
7In a real-life deployment of UnLoc, communication to the server may not be necessary.
The landmarks of a building can be downloaded a priori; clustering and landmark matching
algorithms can be executed locally on the phone.
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• Do real users encounter these landmarks (i.e., is the matching between
the sensor reading and established landmark signatures, reliable)? (Fig-
ure 2.17)
• What is the localization accuracy of a user, in real-time, and offline? (Fig-
ure 2.18, Figure 2.19, Figure 2.20)
2.4.3.1 SLM Detection Performance
Table 2.1 shows the confusion matrix for the detection of all SLMs (using traces
from two malls in Egypt). The matrix shows that some SLMs are easier to detect
than others due to their unique patterns. This leads to zero false positive and
negative rates for the elevators and walking cases. However, even with the dif-
ficult SLMs, the UnLoc’s template signatures can still achieve a high accuracy,
with an overall 0.2% false positive and 1.1% false negative rates.
2.4.3.2 Detecting Organic Landmarks (OLMs)
Figure 2.16(a) shows the number of landmarks detected inside different build-
ings. For the engineering building, the breakup of the landmarks is: 9 magnetic,
8 turns, and 15 WiFi OLMs. For the computer science building, the breakup
is: 9 magnetic, 10 turns, and 10 WiFi OLMs. Perhaps more importantly, Fig-
ure 2.16(b) shows how these landmarks are quite homogeneously scattered in-
side the buildings. We observe that with these numbers of well-scattered land-
marks, a user’s dead-reckoning error is not likely to grow excessively, in turn
helping landmark localization. This well matches our core intuition and expec-
tation.
Figure 2.17(a) reports the accuracy of the landmark locations, as computed
by UnLoc. Observe that aligned with our intuition, the number of landmarks
increase over time, as more users explore the space (Figure 2.17(b)). Moreover,
the accuracy of these landmarks also increases, since different paths bring dif-
ferent independent estimates. In fact, our datasets are limited in diversity of
paths since volunteers could not walk around into any rooms or auditoriums
in these buildings – many were research offices, faculty offices, or classrooms.
In reality, the diversity of different independent paths may be expected to aug-
ment the accuracy.
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2.4.3.3 Landmark Signature Matching
If landmark signatures fluctuate quickly over time, then OLMs will be unstable.
Thus, users may never encounter the established OLMs because their signa-
tures are changing faster than they can be learned. Furthermore, it is entirely
possible that users at a different location sense a signature that matches a far-
away landmark. In such a case, the user’s location will be repositioned to the
(highly erroneous) landmark. To verify if such variations occur in our buildings,
we collected sensor readings on multiple days. We found sound consistency in
the signatures. This is not surprising because all our signatures are designed to
be stable, particularly WiFi and accelerometer/gyroscope based turns. While
the magnetic signatures can change, in our cases we did not observe anything
appreciable.
Nonetheless, recall that UnLoc embraces a conservative approach by using
a low “similarity threshold" while declaring a landmark. In other words, the
signature of the landmark should be very dissimilar with other signatures to
qualify as a landmark. This ensures that when a test user matches a sensed
readings with existing OLMs, the false positive (FP) rate is low. Figure 2.17(c)
quantifies false positives – evidently FP is less than 1%. As a tradeoff for choos-
ing very distinct signatures, it is possible that a test user may not match it well.
Figure 2.17(c) shows that the matching accuracy is reasonably high, although
not perfect. We believe that this is an acceptable tradeoff – given that the num-
ber of landmarks are high, missing a few will affect performance much less than
matching to an incorrect landmark. In other words, UnLoc is in favor of trading
off matching accuracy to maintain low false positives.
Of course, changes in the ambience – say relocation of major electrical equip-
ment to a different room, or deactivated WiFi APs – will affect existing land-
marks, and UnLoc will not be able to match them. However, UnLoc will learn
these changes over time, both the disappearance of the landmark from its orig-
inal location, as well as the emergence of a landmark at a different location. So
long as these changes are not all at the same time, UnLoc should be able to re-
main resilient to landmark churn. We leave the quantification of this claim to
future work.
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2.4.3.4 Localization Performance
In offline localization, whenever a user encounters a landmark, UnLoc learns
the user’s errors, and therefore can track back and partly correct the user’s past
trail. Online, real-time localization does not offer this benefit. Figure 2.18(a)
shows the comparison of these two forms of localization – evidently, the ad-
vantage of offline is appreciable. This implies that for applications which do
not need online tracking, localization error can be within 1.15 m on average,
even with a few landmarks.
Beyond the bootstrapping phase, as UnLoc identifies several organic land-
marks, error correction opportunities will increase. How much accuracy can
we expect in steady state when many OLMs have already been recognized? Fig-
ure 2.18(b) demonstrates the result; mean instantaneous localization error is
within 1.69 m. However, the performance will only improve over time as more
OLMs are detected. Figure 2.19(a) quantifies the intuition. As a user moves
away from a landmark, the location error grows and eventually gets reset at the
next landmark. Initially, UnLoc only has a few landmarks and hence the error
between two landmarks is high. As more landmarks are identified and added to
the system, the error growth is curbed frequently. We aggregate the error over
time across all the users walking on multiple routes, and present the findings
in Figure 2.19(b). The benefits of additional OLMs are evident.
The above results are from experiments across three different buildings us-
ing several landmarks. It is difficult to predict how many such landmarks exist
in other buildings. Thus, it is natural to ask if localization performance will get
derailed if only a few landmarks exist. Figure 2.20 presents location error for
varying landmarks. Even with 10 out of the 28 landmarks, average instanta-
neous location error is within 1.9 m. We expect a few landmarks to be available
in most buildings; when in doubt, UnLoc could even turn on the microphone
to expand to ambient acoustic signatures. While far more rigorous experimen-
tation is necessary (across more buildings, people, phone platforms, and time),
we believe the results from these small-scale tests are promising to justify mov-
ing forward.
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2.4.3.5 Note on Performance Comparison
Table 2.2 shows a qualitative comparison of UnLoc with a number of other
indoor localization schemes. The most relevant scheme for comparison is
EZ [33], which to the best of our knowledge, was among the first to attempt
calibration-free localization. However, we believe that EZ’s reliance on “occa-
sional GPS fixes” in indoor environments could be problematic. We believe
UnLoc’s requirement of only a door location is more dependable/scalable.
Also, UnLoc is far less sensitive to RF signal fluctuations; the data volume
needed to bootstrap is also less. Other schemes in Table 2.2 require war-driving
or special infrastructure; UnLoc is free of both.
2.5 Limitations and Future Work
Heterogeneous Hardware It is possible that the landmark signatures will vary
across smartphone platforms – UnLoc has not been tested for this. However, if
data gathered from smartphones is indexed by the phone’s make and model, it
should be feasible to detect landmark signatures for each distinct model (as we
have, for the Android Nexus series). Thus, in real life, a phone would download
landmark signatures that are specific to its hardware, and run UnLoc for local-
ization. In other words, UnLoc would extend to all platforms from which initial
sensor data has been gathered.
Phone-Orientation Effect We have experimented with the phones in realis-
tic orientation (in pocket and in hand). Handling arbitrary phone orientations
and their effect on the reported sensor values is an important direction for fu-
ture research. As gyroscopes are becoming more available on new phones, they
can be leveraged to map arbitrary orientation to a specific frame of reference.
Meanwhile, orientation-independent features, such as the magnitude of the ac-
celeration, should be investigated.
Energy Footprint UnLoc avoids using sensors that have a high energy foot-
print, e.g., light and sound. This is expected to limit the energy consumed from
sensing. Moreover, UnLoc can incrementally turn on sensors, perhaps depend-
ing on the density of landmarks available in the environment. For example, if
a wing of a building has numerous landmarks, UnLoc could turn off the mag-
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netometer, and use only the accelerometer and compass-based landmarks for
localization. This chapter has not addressed such optimizations – these are part
of our ongoing work.
Scalability Testing A complete UnLoc system needs to be tested over larger
scale, in terms of the number of users and data size. However, as with other
crowd-sourcing based systems, it is difficult for us to deploy a large-scale
testbed. This includes in part providing incentive systems for users to deploy
the system and experiment with it.
2.6 Related Work
Our goal and vision intersect with a number of projects in literature. In partic-
ular, the indoor localization literature is vast, ranging from theoretical models
to simulations to implemented systems [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26]. In the interest of space, we heavily sub-sample this literature,
focusing on systems related to UnLoc.
Calibration-Free Localization A recent work called EZ [33] was among the
first to attempt indoor localization without war-driving. Their key intuition is
that overheard WiFi APs and RSSI can together offer the user’s location (via a
genetic algorithm), provided that a mobile device occasionally gets a GPS fix.
While EZ demonstrates accuracies between 2 m to 7 m, the GPS locks inside a
building can be erratic. Moreover, the precise RF signal propagation may vary
over time due to environmental dynamism. UnLoc eliminates this reliance on
periodic GPS fixes, and only relies on a one-time global truth information e.g.,
the location of a door or staircase or elevator. The entire system can bootstrap
from this.
WiFi-based Techniques Other RF based techniques [12, 14, 16] also inspire
UnLoc. Place Lab [16] is a highly successful project where signals from differ-
ent WiFi and GSM base stations are utilized for localization. A wireless map is
created by war-driving a region; the mobile device localizes itself by compar-
ing overheard APs/cell towers against the wireless map. UCSD’s Active Campus
project [17] adopts similar techniques of localization, but assumes that the lo-
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cation of the WiFi access points are known a priori. RADAR [12] also operates
on WiFi fingerprinting, and is capable of achieving up to 5 m accuracy in in-
door settings. As a tradeoff to accuracy, RADAR needs to carefully calibrate WiFi
signal strengths at many physical locations in the building. High-resolution
calibration is time-consuming and may not scale over wide areas. Some tech-
niques have bypasses the calibration effort through deployment of additional
infrastructure, e.g., Cricket [21], Lease [15], PAL [19], Pinpoint [18]. UnLoc is
designed to be an infrastructure-independent, calibration-free, system.
Dead-Reckoning Dead-reckoning using inertial sensors is a well-studied re-
search area. However, typical sensors used in such domains are expensive and
high-quality ones; coping with noisy smartphone sensors in indoor environ-
ments is far less explored. The key problem is that dead-reckoning suffers from
the accumulation of error, and can grow cubically even with foot-mounted ac-
celerometers [34]. To reduce such error, periodic recalibration with the GPS
has been used in outdoor environments [13, 35]. However, GPS is not avail-
able indoors. UnLoc presents an option to replace GPS with indoor landmarks;
the ability to identify these landmarks in an unsupervised way enables zero-
calibration indoor localization.
Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM) A highly popular and suc-
cessful technique in robotics, called SLAM, allows a robot to simultaneously
discover landmarks and build a map-representation of an indoor environ-
ment [36]. However, SLAM typically depends on using explicit environment
sensors, such as laser range finders and cameras. Moreover, the rotation of
the robot wheels offer a precise computation of displacement. Recently, WiFi-
SLAM [37] proposed the usage of the WiFi signal strength for SLAM based on
a Gaussian Process Latent Variable Model (GP-LVM). However, the multi-path
propagation affects the accuracy of the model that captures the relation be-
tween the WiFi signal and distance. The chapter also assumes that motion
between multiple WiFi samples can be accurately determined. UnLoc is cer-
tainly reminiscent of SLAM, even inspired – however, it is completely different.
Unlike SLAM, UnLoc uses smartphone sensors to compute the displacement
and direction of users; the landmarks are essentially ambient signatures or
user-activities. While ambient signatures and activity recognition have been
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utilized in the past [25, 38], their applicability toward dead-reckoning is, to the
best of our knowledge, novel.
Sensor Fusion Multi-modal sensing has received strong interests – [39] uses a
body worn sensory board (MSB) for human activity recognition. UnLoc, how-
ever, is an early attempt to apply activity recognition to indoor location track-
ing, using cheap mobile phone sensors.
2.7 Conclusion
We observe that inherent properties of indoor environments offer unique op-
portunities to perform localization. The core approach draws from existing
ideas in the literature, and combines them in an unconventional way. Essen-
tially, mobile devices are dead-reckoned using their sensor measurements, but
these same measurements are leveraged to detect unique environmental sig-
natures within the building. These signatures are used to correct the dead-
reckoning error, which in turn improves the location accuracy of these signa-
tures – a recursive procedure. Performance results suggest promise, motivating
us to pursue UnLoc to the point of real deployment.
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: UnLoc architecture – motion vectors are computed from recorded
sensor readings, and the user’s location computed via dead-reckoning. The
dead-reckoning error is periodically reset using landmarks in the
environment. Further, the same sensor readings are mined to identify
signatures of new landmarks. These landmarks help in improving localization
accuracy for subsequent users.
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Figure 2.2: Matrix showing sensor readings collected by devices across time.
Readings are clustered and location of cluster members computed. If all
cluster members fall within a small region, UnLoc deems it an OLM.
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starting and stopping).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.6: (a) UnLoc users walk and periodically encounter landmarks –
refine landmark locations, correct own locations. (b) The solid circle shows the
centroid of the dead-reckoned estimates. Multiple erroneous estimates lead to
a better approximation of the landmark location.
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Figure 2.7: Uncorrelated errors from multiple dead-reckoning estimates.
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Figure 2.8: Decision tree for detecting Seed LandMarks (SLMs). The top level
separates the elevator based on its unique acceleration pattern. The second
level separates the constant velocity classes (stairs and escalator) from the
other two classes (walking and stairs) based on the variance of the
acceleration. The third level uses the variance of magnetic field to separate the
escalator from the stationary case and the correlation between the Z and Y
acceleration components to separate between the stairs and walking cases.
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Figure 2.9: Magnetic variance when a user is climbing stairs versus using an
escalator.
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Figure 2.10: (a) Accelerometer readings (smoothed) from a walking user. (b)
Displacement error with double integration for two users. (c) Error using the
step-count method.
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Figure 2.11: (a) Rotated walking trail due to the gyroscope’s initial bias. (b)
Correcting the gyroscope’s bias using landmarks.
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Figure 2.12: (a) Compass orientation is more reliable when it is correlated with
the gyroscope. (b) CDF of orientation estimation error.
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Figure 2.14: Tradeoff between similarity threshold and number of WiFi
landmarks.
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Figure 2.19: (a) Localization error over time for a single user. (b) Localization
error over time averaged over all users.
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2.9 Tables
Table 2.1: Confusion matrix for classifying different seed landmarks.
Elevator Stationary Escalator Walking Stairs FP FN Traces
Elevator 24 0 0 0 0 0% 0% 24
Stationary 0 31 1 0 0 0% 3.1% 32
Escalator 0 0 22 0 0 0.6% 0% 22
Walking 0 0 0 39 0 0% 0% 39
Stairs 0 0 0 1 52 0% 1.8% 53
Overall 0.2% 1.1% 170
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Table 2.2: Comparison with other localization systems.
Name EZ SLAM Horus UnLoc
Accuracy 2 to 7 m ∼ 5 m ∼ 1 m 1 to 2 m
Pitfalls GPS Lock? Special Sensors (LIDAR, Odometer.) RF Sensitivity Door Location
Overhead None None War-driving None
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CHAPTER 3
VIDEOLOC: VIDEO BASED INDOOR
LOCALIZATION
In Chapter 2, we discussed UnLoc, which achieves high median accuracy of
1.69 m without infrastructure and calibration costs; however, the tail of the er-
ror distribution is long. In some applications, 99th percentile accuracy should
be high and people are willing to pay the price for such accuracy. Therefore, we
also studied solutions using some infrastructures, VideoLoc, where feeds from
surveillance cameras can be leveraged for highly precise localization, without
compromising the privacy of individual users.
While computer vision technologies can estimate a user’s location from
surveillance cameras, the key question in VideoLoc is how to send the esti-
mated location from the camera to the user’s smartphone. To enable such
communication, we need a visual address for the user. While the user’s face
could be one possible approach, however, we believe that it may not always
be visible. Our core technique [8, 9] exploits the intuition that human motion
patterns and clothing colors can together encode several bits of information.
Treating this information as a “visual address”, it is feasible to enable commu-
nication between a camera and a user, while allowing the user to turn off the
“visual address” at will. This core technique in VideoLoc can be extended to
other applications such as augmented reality. Therefore, in this chapter, we will
focus on this core technique and discuss it in a general manner. Results from
real-world experiments show that 12 individuals can be discriminated with
90% accuracy using six seconds of video/motion observations. Video-based
emulation confirms scalability up to 40 users. At the end of the chapter, we
evaluate the localization accuracy of VideoLoc. Results from six users in our
engineering building demonstrate median location errors of 0.11 m and 99th
percentile errors of 0.58 m.
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3.1 Visually Fingerprinting Humans without Face
Recognition
This section develops techniques by which humans can be visually recognized.
While face recognition would be one approach to this problem, we believe that
it may not always be possible to see a person’s face. Our technique is com-
plementary to face recognition, and exploits the intuition that human motion
patterns and clothing colors can together encode several bits of information.
Treating this information as a “temporary fingerprint”, it may be feasible to rec-
ognize an individual with reasonable consistency, while allowing the user to
turn off the fingerprint at will.
One application of visual fingerprints relates to augmented reality, in which
an individual looks at other people through a camera-enabled glass (e.g.,
Google Glass) and views information about them. Another application is in
privacy-preserving pictures – Alice should be able to broadcast her “temporary
fingerprint” to all cameras in the vicinity along with a privacy preference, say-
ing “remove me”. If a stranger’s video happens to include Alice, the device can
recognize her fingerprint in the video and erase her completely. This section
develops the core visual fingerprinting engine – InSight – on the platform of
Android smartphones and a backend server running MATLAB and OpenCV.
This section is published in MobiSys 2015 [9].
3.1.1 Introduction
Imagine a near future where humans are carrying smartphones and wearing
camera-embedded glasses, such as the Google Glass. This section intends to
recognize a human by looking at the individual from any angle, even when the
face is not visible. For instance, Alice may look at people around her in a so-
cial gathering and see the names of each individual – like a virtual name tag
– suitably overlaid on her Google Glass display. Where revealing names is un-
desirable, only a short message could be posted. People at the airport could
post “looking to share a cab”, students in a startup event could post “seeking
a co-founder”, and Alice could view each individual’s posts above their heads
(Figure 3.1). In general, the ability to differentiate individuals visually could
enable human-centric augmented reality [40, 41].
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Face recognition [42, 43] is a possible approach to the above problem. How-
ever, faces are not always visible. Moreover, many people express discomfort
releasing their profile pictures to the cloud, given that it can become a perma-
nent identifier for de-anonymizing other content in the web [44]. Ideally, what
is necessary is a temporary visual identifier, that can be activated at will, and
will identify the individual momentarily but not later.
This section pursues the intuition that human motion patterns and visual ap-
pearance (e.g., clothing colors) can together serve as a temporary visual finger-
print. The key idea is simple. Consider Alice looking at an individual X through
a Google Glass (or smartphone camera). The InSight server could request Al-
ice to upload a short video snippet of that individual, and use the frame se-
quence in this video to extract a motion fingerprint of X , denoted by V Ali ceX .
This motion fingerprint is essentially a string of micro-activities such as walk-
ing direction, stepping frequency, stopping, turning, etc., extracted from the
video. The server can simultaneously request sensor data (e.g., accelerometer,
gyroscope, compass) from people around Alice, and extract a similar motion
fingerprint from it. Let Mi denote this sensor-based motion fingerprint for user
i . By matching V Ali ceX against Mi of each user i , the server can find the strongest
match, say for i =Bob. The server can convey to Alice that she is looking at Bob
and display Bob’s message (e.g., “looking for interns”) on her glass.
Generalizing, visual fingerprints may not only be from motion patterns, but
also from clothing colors, body structure, etc. If Alice recognizes Bob through
motion fingerprints, she can extract Bob’s clothing features and update a
database inside the InSight server. In the steady state, the database would
cache clothing fingerprints for different individuals. When John looks at Bob
later, his Glass only needs to send an image of Bob. The server can extract
the clothing fingerprint from the image sent by John and match against pre-
computed clothing fingerprints, ultimately notifying John that he is looking at
Bob. In summary, we believe that a person’s non-facial visual appearance can
serve as an identifier. There is evidence of this opportunity given that humans
can often recognize other humans without looking at their faces. This section
demonstrates that (wearable) cameras and smartphones can together achieve
the same.
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Realizing the above idea presents a number of challenges. Extracting finger-
prints from sensors and videos can be non-trivial, even though a variety of tools
are available in the signal processing and computer vision literature. The fin-
gerprints need to be general for scalability across individuals, while being ade-
quately discriminating for identification. Moreover, fingerprint matching must
be done across incompatible dimensions (sensor and vision) requiring the sys-
tem to cope with normalization issues, dynamic ranges, depth, perspectives,
etc. Even for matching clothing fingerprints, challenges emerge due to lighting
conditions, wrinkles, and various view angles – the front and back of a dress
may have different colors and patterns. Finally, the system needs to support
incremental deployment (i.e., not everyone may run InSight) while bandwidth
and energy overheads should be minimal.
While developing a robust system is challenging, we find that the rich diver-
sity in human behavior offers promise. People walk/turn/pause at different
time instants, even when they are walking in groups – observed long enough,
each individual’s motion sequence should begin to become unique. Encour-
aged by this opportunity of uniqueness, we adopt a “digital” approach to pro-
cessing the information. Put differently, we express fingerprints as strings de-
fined on a pre-specified motion alphabet. An example fingerprint could be
EEEOOR..., where E , O, and R correspond to the actions of walkEast, noMo-
tion, and turnAround, respectively. Such motion alphabets are extracted from
both sensors and videos, allowing InSight to employ string matching algorithms
for comparing fingerprints.
InSight translates these ideas into a functional system using Android Galaxy
phones and videos taken from Google Glasses. We have not attained real-time
operations yet – the server runs on MATLAB with links to OpenCV and machine
learning libraries, and returns the result within ten seconds. Real-world evalua-
tions demonstrate the ability to discriminate 12 individuals with 90% accuracy,
using six seconds of video/motion observations. Video-based emulation shows
the ability to scale the technique to the order of 40 people. The main contribu-
tions may be summarized below.
• Identifying the possibility that human clothing colors and motion patterns
could serve as temporary fingerprints, complementing face recognition.
We use these fingerprints as new degrees of freedom for human-centric
visual applications.
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• Quantifying the viability and accuracy of fingerprinting with real-world
human behavior. We build a fully functional prototype and demon-
strate promise through micro-benchmarks, real-user evaluation, and
larger-scale video simulation.
The subsequent subsections will expand on these contributions beginning
with an overview of InSight, followed by a detailed system design. However, we
first discuss a few potential applications.
3.1.2 Applications
The goal of this section is to develop the core visual fingerprinting primitives,
with the goal to enable new use-cases or aid known applications. We briefly
discuss a few possibilities here different from the augmented reality application
described above.
3.1.2.1 Privacy Preserving Pictures/Videos (PPP)
The proliferation of cameras, and wearables cameras in recent years, has raised
various discussions on privacy. Many citizens have expressed discomfort at the
thought of being included in a video or a picture taken by a stranger, even if it
was legally done in a public place. Today’s solution is to hastily move out of the
camera’s field of view when it is clear that a picture is being taken. Of course,
this is not always possible because people are often unaware that videos or pic-
tures are being taken around them. Sensitized by this, many privacy conscious
users have wished for a capability to express their privacy preferences, such as
“please remove me from the video”.
Now, assume Alice is taking a video, and Bob, present in the field of view,
intends to be removed from Alice’s video. Bob can share his motion fingerprint
with the server. When Alice takes the video and sends it to the server, visual
fingerprints can be computed for every individual in the video, and compared
against Bob’s. A match suggests Bob is indeed in the video – InSight can then
remove Bob by replacing him with background imagery in the video. Authors
in [45] recently proposed using QR codes on clothing as a means of expressing
privacy preferences. We believe InSight is a more usable solution.
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3.1.2.2 Visual Addressing and Communication
A grocery store is in conversation with us regarding the applicability of InSight
for customer localization and communication. The idea is to use wide-angle
surveillance cameras mounted on high ceilings to observe the top view of mov-
ing customers (each customer visible to the camera as a small blob). Consider
the case where Alice is shopping in the store and her smartphone records her
motion fingerprint, MAli ce . The surveillance camera could also compute her
motion fingerprint from the video frames, VAli ce . Of course, it might take longer
since the motion alphabet (from a top view) will be limited — the camera would
only detect moving, paused, and moving direction. However, even these few
bits of information should be adequate to disambiguate customers in the scale
of a minute (no two customers move/pause in lock step for that long).
Now, it should be possible for the camera to send a message to Alice, by
including VAli ce as an address inside the message (like a virtual MAC address).
When Alice’s device receives the message, a comparison between MAli ce and
VAli ce would indicate that the message is meant for her. Thus, the grocery store
can now establish a communication channel with Alice, sending her location-
based product information (since the camera knows Alice’s exact location).
Even Alice can ask questions such as “where can I find brown rice?” and the
store can respond with “ahead on your right, at the bottom shelf”. Observe
that this visual address-based communication offers privacy since Alice need
not reveal her (permanent) MAC/device IDs. Moreover, she can turn off her
motion sensors at will, terminating all interaction with the store.
While the above applications may not be the best, they define the design
landscape reasonably well for us to build a generic visual fingerprinting system.
The most suitable applications, we hope, will emerge in time.
3.1.3 System Overview
This subsection presents a functional overview of InSight; the technical compo-
nents will follow in Section 3.1.4. For preserving context, we use the augmented
reality application as the central theme in the rest of the section, although the
techniques extend (with minor modifications) to the other applications.
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Consider a university-organized matchmaking event for startups, where a va-
riety of students and faculty come with the goal of forming teams. Upon enter-
ing, users check-in with the InSight server and specify their rough locations.
Later, say Alice looks at an individual X through her Google Glass (or smart-
phone camera) and requests to identify the individual. During the initial boot-
strap phase, the InSight server running in the cloud asks Alice’s glass to record
and upload a video snippet of that individual. The server also requests sensor
data (accelerometer, gyroscope, and compass) from smartphones of all peo-
ple around Alice (Figure 3.2). Once the data arrives, the server processes these
sensor data and extracts motion fingerprints, Mi , for each user i . This motion
fingerprint is essentially a feature vector, where features include isStanding,
isWalking, walking–direction, step–duration, phase, isRotating, pause–timings,
etc. The server also analyzes the video snippet from Alice and computes a simi-
lar motion fingerprint, but from the consecutive frames of the video. Let V Ali ceX
denote this video-based motion fingerprint. By matching V Ali ceX against all val-
ues of Mi , InSight finds the strongest match, say for i = Bob. If this matching
score is greater than a confidence threshold, the server conveys to Alice that
she is looking at Bob, and displays the message Bob intends to share with oth-
ers, e.g., “PhD student in CS, looking for CEO for mobile analytics startup”.
Now, once InSight recognizes Bob in the video snippet, it extracts Bob’s color
fingerprint, CBob , and updates a fingerprint database. This fingerprint essen-
tially captures color features and patterns from Bob’s clothing. Thus, in the
steady state, when everyone’s color fingerprint is registered in the database,
users no longer need to update videos or sensor readings. If John looks at Bob
later (see Figure 3.3), his Glass only needs to send to the server an image of Bob.
The server extracts the color fingerprint from John’s image, C JohnX and matches
against all Ci in the database (the candidate set can be trimmed using John’s
rough location). Assuming C JohnX matches best with Ci=Bob , and the matching
score is above a threshold, the server informs John that he is looking at Bob.
Of course, these color fingerprints are valid in the time scale of events – for an-
other event on the next day, people will be wearing different clothing, and the
color database will have to be re-populated.
We make two observations about the properties of motion and color finger-
printing.
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1. A short window of sensor data is mostly adequate to compute a discrim-
inating motion fingerprint for an individual. This is due to the inherent
diversity of human motion, i.e., people’s micro-motions are not likely to
be synchronous for long durations, and the first instance of “asynchrony”
can be used to tell them apart.
2. As mentioned earlier, once Alice identifies Bob using motion finger-
prints, Bob’s color fingerprint, C Ali ceBob , is added to the fingerprint database
(CBob =C Ali ceBob ). When John identifies Bob later, perhaps from a different
angle, Bob’s fingerprint is further refined (CBob =CBob ∪C JohnBob ).
In general, people’s color fingerprints increasingly become complete over
time, which improves the accuracy of recognition, which further completes the
fingerprint. Thus, motion fingerprints are only necessary to “register” a person
for the first time. Once InSight has bootstrapped, color profiles become effective,
and motion fingerprints are used only to boost matching confidence, if necessary.
The details on what constitutes color and motion fingerprints are presented in
Section 3.1.4.
3.1.3.1 Matching Motion Fingerprints
Motion–fingerprint matching at the InSight server is non-trivial because the
fingerprints are in different domains – MBob is obtained from accelerome-
ter/gyroscope/compass readings, while V Ali ceX is extracted from video frames.
To bring compatibility, we propose to translate all motion fingerprints into a
common semantic alphabet, where example alphabets are “walking north”, “ro-
tating”, “pausing” (see example alphabets in Table 3.1). Thus, both MBob and
V Ali ceX are represented as strings on this alphabet, and fingerprint matching
boils down to string matching. As an example, say Bob and Neil walk north-
ward for three time units, and then Bob pauses while Neil continues walking
for one more unit, and then Neil pauses too. Their respective strings will then
be MBob =N N NOO... and MNei l =N N N NO..., and it would be possible to tell
them apart at the fourth time unit. Specifically, if Alice is looking at Bob, then
InSight will compute V Ali ceX = N N NOO..., which is expected to match better
with MBob . In our actual implementation, the motion alphabet is far more
sophisticated, including different directions of walking, duration and phase of
walking steps, rotations, etc. In fact, for the above case, InSight will analyze
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the duration and phase of walking steps, and unless Bob and Neil are well
synchronized in their footsteps, they will be separated within four time units.
3.1.4 System Design
This subsection describes the extraction of motion and color fingerprints from
sensor and video data, followed by fingerprint matching schemes. The tech-
niques borrow from literature where suitable, with appropriate adaptions to
this specific cross-sensor application.
3.1.4.1 Extracting Motion from Sensor Data
We begin with a description of how sensor readings from Bob’s smartphone are
translated into a motion string. The key motion alphabets that make up this
string are derived from: (1) rotation, (2) walking, (3) walking step duration, (4)
walking step phase, and (5) walking direction.
Rotation Detection Since the phone can be in an unknown orientation, we
cannot rely on any single axis of the gyroscope (x, y, or z) to properly detect ro-
tation. Therefore, we first project the rotation rate vector r = (rx ,ry ,rz) on to
gravity vector g = (gx , g y , gz) in the phone’s coordinate system, i.e., rg r avi t y =
(rx gx + ry g y + rz gz)/
√
g 2x + g 2y + g 2z . Then, the rotation angle around gravity is
αg r avi t y =
∫
rg r avi t y d t . If αg r avi t y exceeds a certain threshold, the user’s mo-
tion is labeled as rotating (denoted by R in the motion alphabet). The alphabet
R is essentially a binary indicator and its natural to ask: why not extract more
bits of information from rotation? This is because detecting various degrees of
human rotation from videos is a difficult problem.
Walking Detection The act of human walking manifests on the accelerome-
ter with periodic high/low impulses as well as some rotation around the gravity
axis. However, due to movements of the phone inside the pocket, and certain
unusual gait patterns, simple threshold-based schemes were inadequate to rec-
ognize walking patterns. Instead, we employ a bagged decision tree model and
train it with two features, namely (1) standard deviation on the magnitude of
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accelerometers, and (2) rotation around gravity. We omit details in the interest
of space, but found this to offer high consistency (as evident in Section 3.1.5.1).
Walking Step Duration Given that people walk with varying speeds, the dura-
tion of walking steps can be a useful discriminator. To this end, we first detect
if the user is walking; if so, we apply a standard Kalman filter on the accelerom-
eter data to first smooth out the reading and accurately identify the local max-
ima. These local peaks shown in Figure 3.4 are actually the time points when
the human feet land on the ground. The peaks closer to the taller raw impulses
correspond to the leg that carries the phone. The step duration, denoted Tstep ,
may be computed as half of the time window between two consecutive peaks.
Note that Tstep can be computed without prior knowledge of which pocket the
phone is in. Even if the phone is in the shirt pocket, or held in the hand, such
peaks are visible, and Tstep can be computed. We have not evaluated the case
of backpacks and jacket pockets.
Walking Phase Even when two users are walking at the same speed, i.e., Tstep
is identical, their exact step timings may be out of phase. Thus, the phase of
walking can also be a component of the motion fingerprint of a person. To this
end, we use the peak around the bigger jerk as the step phase marker, shown in
Figure 3.4. If different users exhibit these peaks at different times, they may be
separated so long as time is appropriately synchronized among devices. If the
accuracy of synchronization is upper bounded by, say δ, then the phase differ-
ences can be measured in that granularity. We show later that our synchroniza-
tion is in the order of
Tstep
3 , permitting us to create three buckets of users with
respect to their walking phases.
Walking Direction InSight intends to leverage the user’s walking direction,
with some granularity, as an attribute of her motion. However, walking direc-
tion estimation is challenging given that the phone is in an unknown orien-
tation on the user’s body. The problem is difficult because the act of walking
imposes various kinds of vertical, horizontal, and sideward forces on the smart-
phone (to stabilize the body), and there is a narrow window during which the
acceleration on the phone is most dominantly along the user’s heading direc-
tion. This narrow time window is actually when the user’s leg swings (or rotates)
forward, captured by the cross product of rotation axis, Raxi s and gravity g .
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More precisely, the user’s heading vector, H =Raxi s×g , illustrated in Figure 3.5.
Given the rotation matrix R from the gyroscope, Raxi s is the null space of
(R−I ) (I is the identity matrix) and rotation angleRθ = ar ccos(
tr ace(R)−1
2
).
In our system, we makeRθ always positive and the sign ofRaxi s is determined
by the right-hand rule. When the leg carrying the phone (called the primary leg)
swings, theRaxi s×g points to user’s heading direction; the same cross product
points in the opposite direction when the secondary leg swings.
Importantly, this cross product must be computed when the leg is in full
swing, otherwise, the sensor data can be polluted with noise (especially when
the leg slows down and strikes the ground). To avoid such noise, InSight
chooses a period of 30% of Tstep starting from the time when the secondary
leg strikes the ground (i.e., when the primary leg is about to swing). Raxi s is
derived from this time window. Figure 3.6(b) shows the H(t )=Raxi s(t )× g (t ),
whereRaxi s(t ) is the rotation axis during [t , t +30%Tstep ]. Clearly, H(t ) alter-
nates its direction as the user swings its primary and secondary legs alternately.
The heading vector is in the phone’s coordinate system and needs to be in-
terpreted in the global magnetic reference frame (i.e., with respect to North).
For this, we project the magnetometer reading to the horizontal plane [46],
and record the angle between this projected vector and the heading vector.
Figure 3.6 shows the results. Vertical dotted lines are the moments when the
heading vector is recorded. As expected, heading direction alternates roughly
180◦ between primary and secondary steps. At the moments of heading vec-
tor recordings, the direction matches the ground truth as it corresponds to the
window when the primary leg swings. Upon close scrutiny, we find that the
estimated walking directions are always slightly higher than the ground truth.
This is because human leg motions are often slightly diagonal, and the actual
walking direction is an average of two diagonals from two steps, resulting in
forward locomotion. We use a calibration factor of 35◦ to compensate for this
effect. The final walking direction is divided into eight directions, in the granu-
larity of 45◦, which creates eight motion alphabets. We describe how the same
motion alphabets are also derived from videos (of Bob) captured from (Alice’s)
Google Glass camera earlier.
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3.1.4.2 Extracting Motion from Video
Given that a video can contain multiple moving individuals, InSight’s first step
is to mark and track every person in the video. This calls for enveloping each
individual with a bounding box. Of course, for motion related insights (such
as walking period, phase, etc.) lower regions of the bounding box need to be
processed to extract alphabets. This subsection describes each of these steps
systematically.
Detection and Tracking To detect and track humans in the video, we bor-
row existing techniques from computer vision [47, 48] and modify it per In-
Sight’s needs. Using the borrowed techniques, Figures 3.7 (a)-(e) show the ac-
curacy of placing a bounding box around each person, along with a confidence
score. To cope with false positives, we only consider the boxes with a confi-
dence score above 50. Now, to track people across the video frames, we again
employ a Kalman filter [49]. Formally, the state of each tracker is denoted by
sk = [xk , yk , vxk , vyk ]T , where {xk , yk } and {vxk , vyk } are the position and speed
of the person in the 2D frame k. Observation z is the center of the bounding
box obtained from the pedestrian detector. We use the following state and ob-
servation equations.
sk+1 = F sk +ωk (3.1)
zk =H sk +uk (3.2)
where
F =

1 0 d t 0
0 1 0 d t
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 H =
(
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
)
d t in F is the duration between adjacent frames, and ωk ∼ N (0,Qk ) and uk ∼
N (0,Rk ) are state model noise and measurement noise, respectively. Qk and
Rk are proportional to the person’s size. Qk is also inversely proportional to the
number of tracked frames.
When processing a new video frame, we employ the method in [50] to asso-
ciate each bounding box with a tracker. In the association process, we lever-
age the observation that position, direction of speed, and size, are not likely to
change significantly in adjacent frames. In fact, the higher the speed of the user,
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the larger the chance that the direction of speed remains the same. Thus, after
association, each target’s Kalman filter goes one iteration further. Unlike [50],
where a single particle filter is used to track the center of the target, we enrich
each tracker with four corners of the bounding box. Each corner is also passed
through a Kalman filter as described above. The bounding box thus filtered is
later utilized for estimating walking direction and step phase detection.
Figures 3.7(a)-(e) show the results from pedestrian detection. Although rea-
sonable, it fails to detect a person in Figure 3.7(b), falsely detects one in Fig-
ure 3.7(c), and suffers from occlusion in Figure 3.7(d). However, Figures 3.7(f)-
(j) show the efficacy of applying tracking. Also, Figures 3.7(f) and 3.7(j) show
that people can be tracked properly even after temporal encounters.
IsWalking and Walking Direction To detect whether the target person is walk-
ing, we use the speed of the bounding box. Since speed is one of the states in
the Kalman filter, we obtain it from the tracking process described earlier. Fig-
ure 3.8 shows 2D speed of the center of the bounding box – higher speeds are
denoted with a longer arrow. People in Figures 3.8(a)-(e) are walking and the
person in Figure 3.8(f) is standing in place. If a person’s movement has signif-
icant speed, then we can detect walking by the mean of 2D speed, sx y , nor-
malized by that person’s height, during a predefined period as given by Equa-
tion 3.3.
sx y = 1
LP
∑
i∈P
√
(c ix)2+ (c iy )2
hi
(3.3)
where P is a collection of frames in the period; LP is the cardinality of P ; c ix and
c iy are the horizontal and vertical components of the target’s center speed at
frame i ; and hi is the target’s height at frame i. However, if the person is walking
mainly along the line perpendicular to the camera’s plane (Figures 3.8(d) and
(e)), sx y can be as small as the case where the person is just standing. To cope
with this scenario, we use a term sz to estimate the target’s motion along the
Z-axis.
sz =αz h
LP −h1
mean{hi : i ∈ P } (3.4)
where αz is a calibration factor such that |sz | and sx y are roughly similar if
the target’s speed is the same whether moving in 2D plane or along the Z-axis.
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When the combined value of sx y + |sz | of a target is above a certain threshold,
we mark that person as walking.
We calculate the user’s walking direction with respect to the camera’s facing
direction. The relative direction is quantized to eight bins with centers at 0◦,
45◦, 90◦,..., 315◦. To classify the direction, we train a model with bagged de-
cision tree with features sx (Equation 3.5), sz , and dz , where dz is the slope
of linear regression of heights. Intuitively, the bounding box’s speed and in-
crease/decrease of its height together help in determining the user’s relative
direction.
sx = 1
LP
∑
i∈P
c ix
hi
(3.5)
Step Duration and Phase To detect the duration and phase of walking steps,
we choose the lower region of the bounding box obtained from the tracker. We
represent the motion in this region through Space-Time Interest Points, which
essentially captures fast changes in video pixels. This technique is borrowed
from [51] and we omit the details in the interest of space. As an abstraction,
the technique marks the fast-changing spots on the video (Figures 3.9(a)-(c))
with brighter spots indicating faster movements. Clearly, the distribution of
spots and their brightness vary while the user is walking. We define a feature,
Fcenter , which captures the rhythm of this alteration. Figure 3.9(d) shows a typ-
ical path of Fcenter – the peaks are essentially the step phase, while the time
separation between the peaks is the step duration. The technique becomes un-
reliable when the user is walking toward or away from the camera, in which
case, we refrain from extracting step duration and phase.
Rotation The technique of Space-Time Interest Points can be applied for de-
tecting rotation as well. The key observation is that rotation causes fast chang-
ing spots to be scattered over the entire bounding box, while other activities
cause the spots to be confined to a relatively smaller region. Figure 3.10 shows
an example where the spots are confined to the hands when the user is mov-
ing them; in contrast, rotation causes the spots to cover the entire body. For-
mally, we define X = {xi } and Y = {yi }, (i = 1,2, .., N ) as the X and Y coordi-
nates of the centroid of the spots. We define the following four features – f1 =
max{X }−mi n{X }, f2 =max{Y }−mi n{Y }, f3 = var {X }, and f4 = var {Y } – and
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train a bagged decision tree to classify the spot distribution. The output is a
binary answer: rotation or not.
Unknown InSight extracts a motion alphabet from each time unit (one sec-
ond). However, confusion arises when the user transitions from one action to
another within that second (e.g., stationary user starts walking). We conserva-
tively deem these time units as an “unknown”. The motion string thus contains
motion alphabets and unknowns interspersed with each other.
3.1.4.3 Matching Motion Strings
We now describe how motion strings obtained from sensors are matched with
motion strings extracted from videos. First, since the walking direction esti-
mated from sensors is with respect to global north, we map it to one of the
eight quantized directions relative to our camera-facing direction. Then, In-
Sight computes the “distance” between the two strings, similar in spirit to edit
distance.
Specifically, denote the motion strings based on the video and sensor data
as V and M , respectively, and their length L (note that the string lengths are
the same). For each position i in the strings, we compare V (i ) and M(i ). The
difference between them is 0 only if: (1) V (i ) and M(i ) are identical or (2) V (i )
and M(i ) both correspond to walking in identical or adjacent directions, their
step durations are within a threshold ratio, and their step phase marker of M(i )
falls into a range calculated from step phase makers of V (i ). Otherwise, their
difference is recorded as 1. Let D be the total difference across the length of
the strings. Then we define string similarity as (1− D
L
). When comparing a
video string of a person X against multiple people’s sensor strings, we pick the
one (say Bob’s) with the single highest similarity (if any). Only if this highest
similarity is above a certain threshold, then X is identified as Bob, otherwise we
declare the recognition as “unsure”.
3.1.4.4 Extracting Color Fingerprint
Once Bob is identified based on his motion, the server extracts and adds his
color fingerprint to its repository. Thereafter, the server may be able to recog-
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nize Bob from an image without seeking video and sensor data, saving both
latency and bandwidth. While various visual features of Bob can be consid-
ered to form his color fingerprint, clothing is an obvious choice as a temporary
fingerprint. Therefore, in this section, we extract the features of Bob’s clothing
and use them as Bob’s color fingerprint. As a first step in getting the fingerprint,
we detect the clothing area in the person’s image. Then, we use a well-known
technique, namely spatiograms, to extract a color fingerprint.
Clothing Area Detection We extract color fingerprints when target is in near-
front or near-back view. The Calvin upper-body detector [52] model is trained
to return bounding-boxes fitting the head and upper half of the torso. Fig-
ure 3.11(a) and Figure 3.11(b) show the detected upper-body; Figure 3.11(c)
shows that the detector doesn’t fire in other views. We then use a pose estima-
tion model [53] trained on Buffy dataset [54], which returns with joints such as
neck, shoulder, etc. The neck and shoulder joints (red lines in Figure 3.11) help
crop the upper-torso area as the clothing area. Then, we apply spatiograms on
the cropped image to extract the target’s color fingerprint.
Spatiograms Spatiograms are essentially color histograms with spatial distri-
butions encoded in its structure. Put differently, while basic color histograms
only capture the relative frequency of each color, spatiograms capture how
these colors are distributed in 2D space. The second order of spatiogram can
be represented as [55]:
hI (b)=<nb ,µb ,σb >, b = 1,2,3, · · · ,B
where B is the number of color bins, nb is the number of pixels whose value
falls in the bth bin, and µb and σb are the mean vector and covariance matrices
of the coordinates of those pixels, respectively. Through such a representation,
a white over red stripe can be distinguished from a red over white stripe, even
if the number of red and white pixels are identical in both. Also, to cope with
various viewing distances, we normalize the spatial information with respect
to the shoulder width so that all the spatial representation is relative to the cap-
tured body size in each photo. Finally, to decouple lighting conditions from
the colors, we convert the pixels from RGB to HSV , and quantize them into
B = 5×1×2 bins.
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3.1.4.5 Color Fingerprint Matching
When John views Bob through his glass – either from the front or the back
– InSight again crops out a region around Bob’s upper body, and applies the
same fingerprinting operations on this image. These fingerprints – one in the
repository and another from John – are now ready for matching. Our match-
ing algorithm first computes the spatiogram similarity between each person in
John’s view with Bob’s fingerprint in the repository. Denote the spatiograms to
be compared as S = {n,µ,σ} and S ′ = {n ′ ,µ′ ,σ′}, both having B color bins. We
define the similarity measure as in [56]:
ρ =
B∑
b=1
√
nbn
′
b 8pi|ΣbΣ
′
b |1/4 N (µb ;µ
′
b ,2(Σb +Σ
′
b))
Essentially, the similarity decreases (following a Gaussian function) with in-
creasing difference between the colors and their spatial locations. Fingerprints
are considered to match if ρ is greater than a certain threshold.
When motion information (video and sensor data) is available in addition
to clothing fingerprints, InSight server utilizes them both to make the recog-
nition more robust. First, it computes the ρ value for each video frame that
captures target’s near-front or near-back view, and calculates the mean ρ¯. It
deems clothing similarity as 1, if ρ¯ is above a certain threshold and 0 otherwise.
Next, it will compute the overall similarity as the average of motion similarity
and color similarity. Then, it will pick a person with the single highest overall
similarity. If this person’s overall similarity is above a certain threshold, then
InSight returns the person’s name, and unsure otherwise.
3.1.5 Evaluation
This subsection is organized in three parts: (1) Micro-benchmarks to evaluate
the accuracy with which motion alphabets can be detected from each second
of video and sensor data. (2) Scenario with real users to evaluate InSight’s abil-
ity to discriminate individuals through motion/visual fingerprint comparison.
(3) Video simulation to evaluate scalability across large number of users. The
experiment design and details are presented under each of the three parts.
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3.1.5.1 Micro-Benchmark (for Motion Alphabets)
Experiment Design Motion alphabets define the atomic operation in InSight.
This subsection evaluates whether each second in videos and sensor data can
be reliably converted to motion alphabets. For this, we recruited 12 volunteers,
gave each of them a Samsung Android phone running an InSight client, and
asked each of them to cover various actions, such as walking, rotations, taking
turns, standing still, etc., as well as some upper-body movements like checking
emails, stretching, etc. in an area of 20 m × 15 m outside our building. During
the entire experiment, a designated observer video-recorded each volunteer’s
motion patterns separately. The experiment was performed in four sessions
and in total 80 minutes of sensor and video data were collected (and each frame
manually labeled for ground truth). These videos were then examined frame by
frame and manually labeled with ground truth (i.e., each second of the video
was tagged with one of the motion alphabets, such as walking or not, walking
direction, starting and ending frame of each step, rotating or not, etc.).
Results
Walking Detection We use a three-fold cross-validation to evaluate the ac-
curacy of walk-detection. Recall that walking detection with sensors is based
on bagged decision trees, while for videos, we used a calibration factor αz and
a motion threshold. We set αz = 4 and motion threshold of 0.5. Figure 3.12
shows the confusion matrix – evidently, the detector is highly accurate for both
sensors and videos, with mis-detection not above 0.6% and 1.5%, respectively.
Step Duration We painstakingly computed the ground truth for step dura-
tion, i.e., the start and end time of each step. This enables comparison with
estimates made from video and sensor data. Figure 3.13 plots the CDF of the
relative error for both dimensions of information. The error distribution with
videos exhibits a staircase function since the ground truth was marked in the
units of video frames. Overall, the relative error is less than 8% in more than
85% instances for both video and sensor data.
Walking Direction Using sensor data, we compute the walking direction
w.r.t. global north and plot the relative error in Figure 3.14. Evidently, the error
is not high and confined mostly to±45◦ around the true value. We also estimate
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the walking direction from the videos and classify them into one of eight classes
– Figure 3.15 reports the confusion matrix. Classification accuracy (at 45◦ gran-
ularity) is consistently high, and the slight confusion is mostly with adjacent
angular directions.
Step Phase Recall that step phase of two individuals is the difference be-
tween the time points at which their respective feet strike the ground. Fig-
ure 3.16(a) shows the histogram of the difference in the phase (normalized by
Tstep ), estimated from the sensor data and compared against ground truth. Fig-
ure 3.16(b) shows the same histogram but computed from video data. However,
for recognizing individuals in InSight, what matters is the video-sensor phase
offset (i.e., the difference in phase computed between video and sensor data).
Figure 3.16(c) shows this difference. The graph suggests that the resolution at
which step phases can be discriminated is around 0.3×Tstep (Tstep is the step
duration) – two individuals that are different by less than this value will appear
to be in lock-step.
Rotation Recall that, rotation is detected from videos by training a bagged
decision tree and classifying the identified spot distribution (Figure 3.10). For
extracting rotation from sensor data, we compute the rotation angle around
gravity, αg r avi t y , and apply a threshold of 15◦. Figure 3.17 reports the a confu-
sion matrix. The high accuracy confirms reliable rotation detection.
3.1.5.2 Real User Scenario
The above evaluation shows the consistent accuracy of detecting motion al-
phabets from both video and sensor data. We extract motion strings from in-
dividuals and examines the discriminative abilities in them below. The overall
performance depends on two factors: (1) the inherent diversity in human mo-
tion patterns, and (2) effectiveness of InSight’s fingerprint design and matching
schemes.
Experiment Design We again conduct experiments with the help of the same
12 volunteers as before. But, unlike the micro-benchmark setting, in this set
of experiments, the volunteers’ motion and behavior were completely natural.
They were allowed to naturally move around or pause, and do as they pleased.
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They were also not instructed about clothing; they came to the experiment
wearing the same clothes that they wore to school that morning.
We have not developed a real-time version of InSight. Our current evaluation
is offline and structured as follows. We pretend that the observer requests to
recognize one of the volunteers at a random time t . Starting at time t in our
dataset, we crop out a 10 second video of that volunteer, as well as a 10 sec-
ond sensor stream from all 12 smartphones. A motion string derived from this
video is then matched against all the motion strings derived from the sensors.
The string matching algorithm either returns a matching smartphone (or vol-
unteer), or returns unsure if there is no single highest score or the score is below
a threshold (set to 0.95). We repeat this experiment 100 times with different re-
quest times.
Results Figure 3.18 shows the recognition accuracy. To understand the con-
tribution of different motion alphabets toward overall human recognition, we
evaluate various combinations of alphabets. Figure 3.18(a) starts with the sim-
plest one – walking or not. In other words, for each second of the video and sen-
sor data, a volunteer’s motion is categorized as walking or not walking. Then,
for increasing string lengths, we plot the performance of the matching scheme.
For increasing time durations (on the X-axis), we show the fraction of people
correctly recognized, incorrectly recognized, and unsure. For instance, from
the first seven seconds of video and sensor data, we could correctly recognize
2% of the cases and the rest were unsure (none incorrectly recognized). As
we consider longer durations of motion, recognition performance improves,
reaching 7% with 10 seconds of motion. This improvement is expected since
motion of two individuals diverges over time making them more distinguish-
able. Of course, the distinguishability is not high in this case, since walking
alone, is hardly a strong discriminator.
To improve over a binary walking indicator, we include walking direction in
the motion alphabet (quantized to eight classes) and present its performance
in Figure 3.18(b). Understandably, walking direction helps improve the recog-
nition, up to 30%. Similarly, Figure 3.18(c) and Figure 3.18(d) indicate that con-
sidering step phase and duration together along with walking direction can rec-
ognize individuals correctly in 50% of the cases. Figure 3.18(e) shows that when
rotating or not is further added to the alphabet (in addition to walking direc-
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tion/phase/duration), a person can be recognized in close to 72% cases with 10
seconds of observations.
Finally, clothing fingerprints can also be used in combination with motion
based alphabets for recognizing humans. Figure 3.18(f) shows that when cloth-
ing fingerprint is used in conjunction with motion, six seconds of observation
are sufficient to recognize a person with 90% probability. Overall, these results
demonstrate that motion and clothing together help recognize individuals ac-
curately, and recognition performance improves over time.
3.1.5.3 Video Simulation (for Scale)
Experiment Design Recruiting a large number of volunteers and bringing
them for multiple social experiments proved more difficult than we imagined.
Still, to gain insights on InSight’s scalability to higher user density and different
settings, we resort to an approximation. Our key idea is to record video of
people in public places, and even though we do not have sensor data from
them, we will synthesize sensor data by injecting statistical error into ground
truth observations. For this we execute the following steps:
1. Record videos of people in public places, such as university cafes, grocery
stores, busy street intersections.
2. Extract the video-based motion fingerprints for each user in the video,
denoted Vi .
3. Manually extract ground truth for each user from the video, denoted Ti .
4. Inject errors into the ground truth based on past error distributions, ob-
served when extracting motion alphabets from sensors (i.e., Mi = Ti +
Er r or ).
5. Compare the video-based motion strings to the synthetic sensor based
strings (i.e., Vx ==Mi ?).
The results should be a faithful approximation of InSight’s performance at
scale.
The motion alphabets are synthesized as follows. To determine whether a
person is walking or not, we use the confusion matrix shown in Figure 3.12(a).
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Specifically, if a person is walking as per the ground truth, then the person is
marked as walking with 99.4% probability and as not-walking with 0.6% proba-
bility; when the person is not walking, the motion is marked as walking and not-
walking with 0.1% and 99.9% probability, respectively. We follow the same for
deciding rotating or not, using the rotation confusion matrix in Figure 3.17(a).
To obtain the step duration, we add a random error to the ground truth, fol-
lowing the distribution in Figure 3.13. For step direction, we do the same using
the distribution from Figure 3.14. For determining the step phase, we add a
random shift according to the step phase distribution in Figure 3.16 (a). The
random shift varies from −9.1% of Tstep to 25.3% of Tstep . Now, since the er-
ror distributions were from a 12 member evaluation, the variance is likely to be
smaller compared to a larger population. To account for such situations, we
added additional errors to ensure the data is not optimistic.
The public videos were recorded under three different scenarios – near a busy
area outside the student union during summer (referred to as the “union” video
later), at the CS department cafe in the winter (referred to as the “cafe” video),
and at the entrance of a store in the winter (referred as the “store” video). Fig-
ure 3.19 shows example video frames. People moved in and out of the videos –
so at any typical time instant, we observed between 3 to 10 in the view finder.
However, for each of the videos, we computed motion fingerprints of all the
people across time, and then compare against each other. For instance, the
union video included 40 distinct individuals in five minutes, and we pretend as
if all the 40 people were present at the same time. InSight is expected to be able
to discriminate each individual accurately from these 40 individuals. The cafe
and store had 15 people each due to less churn.
Results Figure 3.20 reports results from the “union” video simulations. As a
high-level summary, InSight was able to recognize most of the users by com-
bining motion and clothing. Specifically, since the recording was in summer,
people wore colorful clothing, which by itself achieved 50% accuracy among
40 people. Expectedly, motion aided this discrimination; however, given that
many users walked often, walking-or-not was not a major discriminator. Walk-
ing direction and step duration were helpful, but still not sufficient due to the
high density of users (users mostly walked in two dominant direction, one to-
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ward the restaurants, and another toward dorms). However, when including
walking phase, results improved significantly.
We zoom into the results here. Figure 3.20(a) shows the clothing confusion
matrix across 40 people. Figure 3.20(b) and Figure 3.20(c) plot the recognition
performance over time, using motion alone followed by motion+clothing. Fig-
ure 3.20(d) shows the confusion matrix after combining motion and clothing
and the similarity threshold set to 0.95. Using clothing alone, InSight recognizes
50% of individuals. Using motion alone, InSight recognizes 40% of individuals
within 10 seconds; with the combination of clothing and motion, the recogni-
tion performance rises up to 88% within 5 seconds and 90% within 8 seconds.
Figure 3.21 and Figure 3.22 report on the results from the “cafe” and “store”
video simulations. Since both scenarios were recorded in winter, a majority of
the people were wearing dark shades (dominantly black and gray). Thus, in
both cases, clothing offered fewer bits of information. However, motion com-
pensated well, especially in the cafe where people walked, paused, turned, etc.
With combined clothing and motion, InSight achieves 80% accuracy in 6 sec-
onds, 93% in 8 seconds at the cafe, and 87% in 5 seconds, 93% in 10 seconds at
the store.
The results suggest that humans inherently exhibit diversity in their motion
and clothing patterns that even low-resolution feature vectors offer promise
of identification. Where faces are permanent and high entropy fingerprints,
these motion strings could serve as a useful alternative, when temporary “visual
identification” is of interest, without revealing persistent identities.
3.1.6 Points of Discussion
We discuss a number of limitations and untapped opportunities with InSight.
Coping with Practical Hurdles While we believe InSight is amenable to de-
ployment in the real world, it needs to be engineered, tested, and fine-tuned
for various practical scenarios. Occlusions is perhaps the key limitation at this
point. In a crowded environment, an individual is likely to be occluded by
others, preventing the computer vision algorithm from carving out a precise
bounding box for each person. This can inject confusion in the system, espe-
cially if the bounding boxes erroneously include different parts of two or more
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individuals. Coping with these complications is left to future work. Also, low
lighting intensity in certain environments may affect visual clarity and finger-
printing. Further, people may change clothing, such as put on a scarf or take
off their jackets, after their fingerprints have been registered in the database.
Of course, motion fingerprints are a dependable fallback to cope with some of
these situations; however, their efficacy in the wild remains to be seen.
Real Time Operation In its current form, InSight is an offline system. Running
this online will require substantial “heavy lifting” likely to be executed in the
cloud [57] or cloudlets [58]. This section’s focus is toward demonstrating the
core opportunity, that is the necessary engineering for an end-to-end system
will depend on the application in question, and is a separate work altogether.
Innovative research is yielding intelligent cloud-offloading techniques [57, 58],
designed explicitly for applications like InSight. In view of this, we believe real-
time operation will be feasible over time, perhaps requiring porting InSight on
MAUI-like programming frameworks [57].
Energy The energy footprint of InSight may not be excessive. Motion sensors
on smartphones need not consume much energy even after prolonged contin-
uous sensing. The camera on the other hand can be activated only when the
user desires to view annotations of the environment (e.g., when Alice wants to
learn the identity of a particular person). This is true even for other applica-
tions such as privacy preserving pictures; the camera is again used only during
the recording of a video or for taking a picture.
Incremental Deployment If some users do not run InSight on their phones,
the fingerprint matching process faces additional challenges. For instance, Al-
ice may be looking at Bob in reality, and even though Bob is not running In-
Sight, Bob’s clothing fingerprint may match best with Chris (a registered user).
To avoid such errors, InSight requires that the fingerprint matching threshold
be very high, with the hope that motion-based matching would be triggered.
Nonetheless, certain scenarios (such as weddings, funerals, uniformed school
children) may still derail InSight. Perhaps an adaptive process is needed, where
the InSight server identifies large similarities in clothing patterns and triggers
motion-based matching more aggressively.
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Utilizing All Bits of Information Upon receiving a video clip, InSight can ex-
tract clothing fingerprints for multiple people even if it is unable to map them
to their identities. Over time, the repository of unnamed clothing fingerprints
increases. Now, as individuals get identified through motion, it may be possible
to resolve some of the other clothing fingerprints via the process of elimination.
We envisage that such a form of inferencing would be possible due to the global
view on the fingerprint data, available at the InSight server. We have not tapped
this opportunity in this section.
Peer-to-Peer Version of InSight While we describe InSight as a cloud-based
system, it is also possible to realize it over a peer-to-peer model. The sequence
of operations, somewhat different from Figure 3.2, can be as follows. (1) Alice’s
glass takes a picture of X and broadcasts it, asking “who is the person in the
picture?”; simultaneously it starts recoding a video snippet. (2) Smartphones
in the vicinity receive the image (over Bluetooth or WiFi Direct), extract the
color fingerprint, and match it with their self color fingerprint (if they have
one); simultaneously each of them activate their motion sensors. (3) These
smartphones send their color fingerprint matching score along with their sen-
sor data to Alice’s glass. (4) Alice’s phone computes the motion matching score,
combines it with the color score, and ultimately identifies X as Bob. (5) Alice’s
glass extracts Bob’s color fingerprint from the video snippet and unicasts it to
Bob’s smartphone, which updates its own fingerprint. Of course, such a system
assumes that smartphones are capable of executing the compute-heavy algo-
rithms locally, which is perhaps difficult in today’s platforms.
3.1.7 Related Work
There exist several works on activity recognition based on video [59, 51] and
sensors [60]. TagSense [61] uses motion as an indication of whether a person
is in the picture, but does not need to actually identify each individual. Face
recognition and other visual bio-metrics are, of course, possible alternatives
[42, 62, 63], but need the face to be visible (in addition to practical concerns
on revealing a permanent identifier). InSight, on the other hand, temporarily
fingerprints individuals, exposing only soft-biometrics of the user that cannot
identify them later. We observe that InSight is different from gait analysis [63],
used to “fingerprint” individuals. While gait analysis zooms into the intricacies
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of walking patterns (i.e., how one walks), we use far higher-level motion alpha-
bets capturing duration of walks, turns, pauses (none of which is permanent).
Authors in [64] proposed the usage of walking speed extracted from the infras-
tructure camera and wireless accelerometer sensor node worn on users’ belts.
InSight combines a rich set of motion alphabets and clothing colors to boost the
power of the “fingerprint”. In addition, InSight fuses multimodal sensor data on
off-the-shelf smartphones to bypass the needs for wearing customized sensor
nodes on users’ belts.
The specific applications we have discussed have received research attention
in the recent past [65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70]. Researchers have explored the possibil-
ity of looking at objects in a store, using wearable devices and radio-optical bea-
cons [65] and/or RFID-based techniques [67]. Such modes of communication
are innovative and complementary to InSight. Qualcomm Vuforia [71] is a com-
mercial Mobile AR SDK for object recognition and 3D object tracking. Videogu-
ide [72] is a Vuforia app used to animate architecture work in the Barcelona
museum. Contrary to Vuforia which requires deployment in advance, InSight
is a training-free system intended for humans.
Privacy preservation in the age of wearable cameras is also witnessing con-
siderable research attention. Authors in [45] suggest a QR code pasted on peo-
ple’s clothing, as an expression of privacy preferences to surrounding cameras.
Of course, the QR code may not necessarily be in view of the camera; read-
ing from longer ranges is difficult; with human motion, reading QR codes is
difficult. PrivateEye [73] proposes to avoid recording objects by drawing a sig-
nature shape around it. InSight, on the other hand, does not require any form
of instrumentation, except that the smartphone should run the app. Natural
behavior of humans should exhibit adequate diversity for recognition, in turn
useful for inclusion, exclusion, or communication.
Our workshop paper on InSight [8] was an initial exploration into the pos-
sibility of using clothing colors as a temporary visual identifier. This section
builds on the workshop version in multiple fronts, including (1) the signif-
icant addition of motion information to the notion of visual fingerprinting,
(2) a range of techniques to correlate motion from vision and device sensors,
(3) the idea of expressing fingerprints as activity–strings and applying string
matching algorithms on them, (4) a more complete evaluation through micro-
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benchmarks and offline evaluation, and finally (5) isolating the notion of visual
fingerprinting and discussing its various applications in augmented reality,
privacy-preserving pictures, and indoor localization.
3.1.8 Conclusion
This section pursues a hypothesis that motion patterns and clothing colors may
pose as a human fingerprint, adequate to discriminate one individual from oth-
ers. If successful, such a fingerprint could be effectively used toward human
recognition or content announcement in the visual vicinity, and more broadly
toward enabling human-centric augmented reality. Pivoted on this vision, we
develop a proof of concept – InSight – which combines the motion fingerprint
and clothing colors for human recognition. We find promise in this direction,
and are committed to building a fuller, real-time system.
3.2 Localization Accuracy
To evaluate the localization accuracy of VideoLoc, we conduct experiments
with the help of six volunteers. Each of them naturally moved around and did
as they pleased in an area of 100 m2 in our engineering lobby for 1.5 mins. A
designated observer video-recorded volunteers (see Figure 3.23). We manually
labeled eight pairs of points from a video frame and the building floorplan to
find the projective transform between the two frameworks. Note that this man-
ual labeling is a one-time effort as long as the camera does not move. Using
this transform, we were able to calculate the real-world location for any given
pixel in the frame. The video was then examined frame by frame and manually
labeled with the location for each subject. These labeled locations were trans-
formed to the floorplan framework and used as ground truth.
We borrow existing computer vision techniques [47, 48, 74, 75, 76, 77] to track
the subjects and estimate their locations. Figure 3.23 shows a typical example
of localization results. Figure 3.23(a) shows the estimated locations in the im-
age framework. Figure 3.23(b) shows the estimated locations in the floorplan
framework.
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Figure 3.24 plots the CDF of localization error. The average across all six sub-
jects is shown in black, while the localization error for each individual subject
shown in gray. We observe that the median error is 0.11 m, while for 99th per-
centile, the error is 0.58 m.
3.3 Discussion
Using surveillance cameras to track humans is certainly not new [47, 48, 74, 75,
76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82]. Our preliminary evaluation using existing computer
vision techniques [47, 48, 74, 75, 76, 77] confirms that video-based localization
holds promise for high accuracy. However, the key question in VideoLoc is how
to send the estimated location from the camera to the user’s smartphone. To
enable such communication, we need the user’s visual address. While the user’s
face [42, 43], gait [63], walking speed [64], etc. could be possible approaches,
we found they may not be always sufficient. We developed our core technique
– InSight – which is a general “visual addressing” technique and is the main
focus of this chapter. In VideoLoc scenario, we can leverage the geographical
knowledge of the scene to fully unleash the power of “visual address”. We leave
this opportunity to future work.
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3.4 Figures
Figure 3.1: Example social event: Alice views people’s posts displayed in her
Google Glass. The whole operation is orchestrated by the InSight server
running in the cloud.
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Figure 3.2: Motion fingerprint-based matching during initialization and for
new InSight users.
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Figure 3.4: Magnitude of the accelerometer readings (smoothed) with the step
marker while the user is walking.
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Figure 3.5: Heading vector = cross product of rotation axis and gravity.
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Figure 3.6: Walking direction. (top) Magnitude of acceleration while user is
walking. (middle) Heading vector. Dotted lines are the moments when
heading vector is calculated. (bottom) Estimated walking direction (ground
truth of 0◦ in red). As expected, they match at the primary steps and differ by
180◦ at the secondary steps (with heading direction opposite of the primary
steps).
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(j)
Figure 3.7: Pedestrian detection and tracking. (a)-(e) Pedestrian detection
results. (f)-(j) Tracking results. (b) A temporal miss. (c) A temporal wrong
detection. (d) A miss caused by occlusion.
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Figure 3.8: Center speed in 2D plane. (a)-(c) Cases with significant speed.
(d)-(f) Cases with insignificant speed.
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Figure 3.9: Walking phase and duration. (a)-(c) Centers of detected cuboids.
(d) The walking phase feature and the detected steps. Points A, B and C in (d)
correspond to the instances in (a), (b) and (c), respectively.
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(a) (c)
Figure 3.10: Scattering of motion spots. (a) Rubbing hands. (b) Putting hands
into pocket. (c) Rotating.
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(b) (c)
Figure 3.11: View detection and shoulder estimation. (a) Near-front view. (b)
Near-back view. (c) An example of the other views. Green dashed boxes show
the detected upper-body. Red solid lines are shoulder extracted by pose
estimation.
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Figure 3.12: Walking or not. (a) Results by sensors. (b) Results by vision.
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Figure 3.13: Step duration estimation error compared to ground truth.
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Figure 3.14: Walking direction estimation: relative error with sensors.
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Figure 3.15: Walking direction estimation: confusion matrix for quantized
directions based on video.
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Figure 3.16: Step phase marker distribution. (a) Sensor phase markers with
respect to ground truth. (b) Video phase markers with respect to ground truth.
(c) Sensor phase markers with respect to video phase markers.
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Figure 3.17: Rotating or not. (a) Results by sensors. (b) Results by vision.
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Figure 3.18: Recognition performance with motion alphabets and color
fingerprints. (a) Walking or not only. (b) Walking direction only. (c) Walking
direction with walking phase. (d) Walking direction with step phase and
duration. (e) All motion alphabets including rotation. (f) All motion alphabets
along with color fingerprints.
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(c)
Figure 3.19: Example frames. (a) Outside student union. (b) University cafe.
(c) Store.
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Figure 3.20: Union video performance. (a) Clothing only confusion matrix. (b)
Motion only. (c) Motion + clothing. (d) Motion + clothing confusion matrix
(after applying a threshold of 0.95 on similarity score).
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Figure 3.21: Cafe video simulation. (a) Clothing only confusion matrix. (b)
Motion only. (c) Motion + clothing. (d) Motion + clothing confusion matrix
(after applying a threshold of 0.95 on similarity score).
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Figure 3.22: Store video simulation. (a) Clothing only confusion matrix. (b)
Motion only. (c) Motion + clothing. (d) Motion + clothing confusion matrix
(after applying a threshold of 0.95 on similarity score).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.23: A typical example of localization results. (a) Bounding boxes with
labeled numbers are our subjects. Red dots show the estimated locations. (b)
Estimated locations transformed to the floorplan framework.
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Figure 3.24: CDF of localization error for each of the six subjects.
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3.5 Tables
Table 3.1: A few examples of motion alphabet. InSight uses much more
fine-grained alphabets.
Motion Alphabet Explanation
O stationary, paused
N walking north
S walking south
E walking east
W waling west
R rotating
U undetermined motion
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CHAPTER 4
MOLE: MOTION LEAKS THROUGH
SMARTWATCH SENSORS
Imagine a user typing on a laptop keyboard while wearing a smartwatch. This
chapter asks whether motion sensors from the watch can leak information
about what the user is typing. While it is not surprising that some informa-
tion will be leaked, the question is how much? We find that when motion
signal processing is combined with patterns in English language, the leakage
is substantial. Reported results show that when a user types a word W , it is
possible to shortlist a median of 24 words, such that W is in this shortlist.
When the word is longer than six characters, the median shortlist drops to 10.
Of course, such leaks happen without requiring any training from the user, and
also under the (obvious) condition that the watch is only on the left hand. We
believe this is surprising and merits awareness, especially in light of various
continuous sensing apps that are emerging in the app market. Moreover, we
discover additional “leaks” that can further reduce the shortlist – we leave these
exploitations to future work. This chapter is published in MobiCom 2015 [10].
4.1 Introduction
Rich sensors on wearable devices are offering valuable data, enabling impor-
tant applications in mobile health, user-interfaces, context-awareness, activity
tracking, gaming, etc. Of course, such data is often a “double-edged sword”
since it leaks information about aspects of lives that are considered private. In
our struggle to define what level of data exposure is appropriate, the core ques-
tion often comes to: what can be inferred from a given sensor data? Every so
often, we find that highly surprising inferences can be made from an appar-
ently harmless piece of data, forcing us to push back on information exposure.
While this is a broad area of research, and immense work has been performed
in this direction, new platforms and applications warrant a continuous vigil
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on information leakage. This chapter looks into a narrow piece of this general
problem. We ask: can accelerometer and gyroscope data from smartwatches be
mined to infer the words that a user is typing? In other words, given that a user’s
wrist moves in the granularity of few centimeters while typing, can the corre-
sponding motion data be used to derive the keys that the user has typed? If so,
the ramifications are serious – a smartwatch app can be disguised as an activity
tracker to heavily leak a user’s emails, search queries, and other keyboard-typed
documents. Unlike keystroke loggers that need to find loopholes in the oper-
ating system, the activity tracker malware can obtain the user’s permission and
easily launch a side channel attack.
This is not the first work that combines motion data processing with lan-
guage structure to infer higher-level semantics. Recent research has explored
various systems and applications, including writing in the air [83], remote con-
trol [84], gesture-based signing and authentication [85, 86], smoking gestures
[87], etc. While all these systems bear similarity in abstraction, unique chal-
lenges (and opportunities) emerge when a particular application is addressed
end to end. In our case, we find that the absence of data from the right hand
is a unique constraint, and so is the issue of inferring which finger executed
the key-press. For a given position of the smartwatch, any one of three or four
different keys could have been pressed, which could be further interspersed
by an unknown number of keys pressed by the right hand. Moreover, not all
users type with equal dexterity – some use their little finger far less efficiently
while others use specific fingers when it comes to digits or corner keys. Finally,
detecting the typed key is also a function of where the finger was previously,
injecting a notion of dependency between consecutive inferences. With these
and more application-specific issues, global typing or motion models do not
apply. While fundamentally new signal processing or learning algorithms may
not be needed, modifying existing techniques and systematically integrating
them into a whole is the crux of our contribution.
Importantly, the application of typing also offers a number of opportunities
that should be leveraged to improve the inference capability of the watch. For
instance, the watch motion is mostly confined to the 2D keyboard plane, in
contrast to 3D gestures in the air in other applications [85, 88]. The orienta-
tion of the watch is relatively uniform across various users and, in many users,
moves back to a reference position while typing (the “F” and “J” keys). Finally,
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knowing spelling priors from the English dictionary further helps in developing
Bayesian decisions. The combination of these challenges and opportunities
motivates the research, with the aim of quantifying the degree of information
leakage.
This chapter develops Motion Leaks (MoLe), a completely functional sys-
tem on Samsung Gear Live smartwatches. Briefly, two of the authors pretend
to be attackers and type 500 words each wearing the smartwatch on the left
wrist. The accelerometer and gyroscope data is used as training data, and
processed through a sequence of steps, including key-press detection, hand-
motion tracking, character point cloud computation, and Bayesian modeling
and inference. Then, eight different volunteers are recruited, and each is asked
to type 300 different English words from a dictionary. The smartwatch sensor
data from the volunteers is transferred to our server, which then short-lists K
words, ranked in the decreasing order of probability (i.e., the first ranked word
is considered the most probable guess). The actual words typed by volunteers
are then revealed and each word’s rank is computed from the short-list.
We plot the distribution of rank across all the typed words. With this being
the core of the evaluation methodology, we obviously test for various param-
eters and conditions, including different word lengths, sensor sampling rate,
different keyboards, etc. Current limitations of this work include: (1) inabil-
ity to infer non-valid English words, such as passwords; (2) scalability across
different watch models; and (3) inability to parse sentences due to difficulties
in detecting the “space bar”. We have also not tested with other wearable de-
vices, such as Fitbits – we believe with some customization, the attacks can be
launched on those platforms as well.
The main contributions in the chapter may be summarized as:
• Identifying the possibility of leakage when users type while wearing a
smartwatch. We develop the required building blocks through tech-
niques in key-press detection, hand-motion tracking, cross-user data
matching, and Bayesian inference.
• Developing the system on Samsung Gear Live smartwatches and experi-
menting with real users. We perform experiments across eight users and
revealing how typed words can be inferred with reasonable accuracy. In-
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dividuals who came to know about our results expressed a sense of alarm
and suggested that the findings be disseminated publicly.
The rest of the chapter expands on these contributions, beginning with some
groundwork and measurements, followed by system overview, assumptions,
design detail, and evaluation.
4.2 Smartwatch Data: A First Look
To understand the problem landscape, we take a first look into the data from
smartwatches. Basic questions pertain to the amount of wrist displacement
for typed keys, whether displacements for nearby keys are even visually dis-
cernible, whether the displacements are consistent over time, etc. To this end,
two of the authors wore a smartwatch and recorded the accelerometer and gy-
roscope data as they typed each character one by one. The positive X-axis of
the watch is parallel to the arm and pointed toward the fingers, the positive Y-
axis is perpendicular and upward, and the positive Z-axis pointed upward from
the plane of the arm. To capture ground truth, we placed a phone camera right
on top of the keyboard and recorded video at 30 fps (Figure 4.1). A green and a
yellow sticker placed on the watch helps with tracking the watch movement by
using computer vision techniques. The watch, the phone camera, and the key-
board logger were all time-synchronized via the network time protocol (NTP).
The synchronization offers precise correspondence between the sensor and vi-
sual data, extending semantic meaning to the motion signals.
Figure 4.2 shows an example sequence of video frames capturing the process
of typing the character “T”. The left hand starts from a home position (i.e., the
key “F”), moves along the +X direction to press “T”, hits the key, and returns
back to the home position. The yellow arrow on the arm shows the displace-
ment of the green marker on the watch.
Figure 4.3 plots motion data from 20 different characters located on the left
side of the keyboard. For each graph, the X-axis is time and the Y-axis is the
displacement of the watch computed from the accelerometer’s X-axis data (the
accelerometer’s Y-axis and Z-axis are not shown). The light gray vertical bar in
each graph marks the time of the key-press, obtained from the keyboard log-
ger. Observe that the displacements align well with the keyboard’s layout. The
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first row (12345) generates the largest positive displacement and the last row
(zxcvb) produces negative displacement. The left fingers are initially placed on
the third row (asdf), so nearly no displacement is detected for these characters.
Although preliminary, these signals offer first indication of information leakage
through watches.
Figure 4.4 shows the watch displacement for the same 20 keys, but in 2D
space (i.e., using the combined X-axis and Y-axis data from the accelerome-
ter). Each color represents one row on the keyboard. While some keys (e.g., 1,
t, r, 4, 5) are quite isolated, others overlap strongly – in particular, “asdf”, “zxcv”
and “q23” exhibit the strongest overlaps. This is not surprising. Cluster “asdf” is
an outcome of the fingers being on these keys in the home position – the wrist
hardly needs to move when typing these keys. Similarly, the fingers move uni-
formly downward for “zxcv” resulting in similarity between the keys. Finally,
the hand movement for “q” is similar to “2” and “3” even though they are all
not on the same row. This is because the little finger is shorter, and to type the
character “q”, it must move as much as the ring finger must move to type “2”.
Decoding characters gets more complicated when the user types a word
rather than just a single character. Figure 4.5 shows the sequence of hand
displacements where the word “teacher” is typed. Obvious issues emerge: The
wrist motion for each character is no longer aligned with the earlier observa-
tions since the motion is relative to the previous position of the key. Observe
that “e”, “a” and “c” are all far away from their respective clusters detected ear-
lier in Figure 4.4. Moreover, we did not record “h” (pressed by the right hand),
rather a small random motion of the left hand during this time. Finally, real-
world environments do not have cameras, and hence the data is completely
unlabeled – wrong decisions about any of the keys can derail all subsequent
decisions. In sum, while sensor data from smartwatches indeed encodes the
human–typed information, decoding the data reliably in real-world conditions
presents non-trivial challenges.
4.3 System Overview
This section presents a functional overview of MoLe; details of the technical
building blocks will follow in Section 4.4. In the scenario of interest, we assume
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that the attacker has successfully installed the MoLe app in the user’s smart-
watch and is receiving accelerometer and gyroscope data at the MoLe cloud
server.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the flow of operations in the end to end MoLe system. At
the backend server, the attacker types each character on a computer keyboard
multiple times and computes a character point cloud (CPC) similar to the one
in Figure 4.4. The operation is performed offline, and is stored separately for
use later. The cloud can also be computed from multiple people (e.g., accom-
plices of the attacker) strengthening the robustness of the attack.
Now, when the raw sensor data from the user arrives, it is passed through a
“keystroke detection” module, responsible for two tasks. (1) It detects the tim-
ing of each keystroke by analyzing the Z-axis of the sensor data – every time a
user presses a key, the watch exhibits a discernible dip in the negative Z-axis.
(2) It computes the net 2D displacement of the watch by processing the signal
through multiple steps, including gravity removal, mean removal, double inte-
gration, and Kalman filtering. The output of the keystroke detection module
is a set of < locati oni , t i mei > tuples, where locati oni denotes the estimated
location of the watch at t i mei when the key was pressed. When all the locations
are plotted on the 2D plane, an unlabeled point cloud (UPC) emerges (note that
the characters corresponding to each point in this cloud is not known). Figure
4.7 shows a comparison of the character point cloud developed offline by the
attacker and an unlabeled point cloud computed from the attackee’s data.
The UPC is forwarded to the “cloud fitting” module whose task is to assign
approximate labels to the points in UPC. For this, the cloud fitting module ob-
tains the CPC that was computed earlier, and scales and rotates the convex hull
of the CPC to best fit the convex hull of the UPC. The output is a rotated and
scaled CPC which serves as the reference template for decoding the unlabeled
points in UPC.
A Bayesian Inference module (BIM) now accepts three items as input: (1) the
template output from cloud fitting, (2) the unlabeled points from the UPC, and
(3) a dictionary W of valid English words, wi .1 Briefly, for each valid word wi ,
BIM computes the a posteriori probability that the unlabeled points form wi .
1For practical purposes, W contains the 5000 most frequently used English words, available
from [89].
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For instance, if wi is the word “dear”, BIM computes the probability that the first
unlabeled point is “d”, the second unlabeled point is “e”, and so on. The product
of the probabilities is the final probability that the unlabeled points is the word
“dear”. BIM computes this probability for each word wi , and outputs a ranked
list of<wor d , pr obabi l i t y > tuples as a guess of the user-typed word. If it is a
password, the attacker can now try out all the guesses above some probability
threshold; if it is an email or a search query, the attacker could manually try
to decode the text from the possible sets of words. Even though MoLe does
not offer a single suggestion, the probability estimate associated to each guess
dramatically reduces the search space for the attacker. Results in Section 4.5.2
will quantify this reduction from the attacker’s point of view.
4.3.1 Assumptions
Before moving forward, we intend to enumerate a number of assumptions we
make. These assumptions make MoLe inadequate for launching a real-life at-
tack, however, we believe that the assumptions are not fundamental and can
be relaxed with some more work.
• The evaluation is performed in a controlled environment where volun-
teers type one word at a time (as opposed to free-flowing sentences).
• We assume valid English words – passwords that contain interspersed
digits, or non-English character-sequences, are not decodable as of now.
• We have used the same Samsung smartwatch model for both the attacker
and the user – in reality the attacker can generate the CPC for different
watch models and use the appropriate one based on the user’s model.
• We assume the user is seasoned in typing in that he or she roughly uses
the appropriate fingers; novice typists who do not abide by basic typing
rules may not be subject to our proposed attacks.
Under these assumptions, the design details and evaluation of MoLe are pre-
sented in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5.
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4.4 Design Details
We describe the main techniques executed by each module in Figure 4.6.
4.4.1 Keystroke Detector
Given sensor signals as input, this module is responsible for computing the
time and location of each key-press present in the signal. The location is essen-
tially a 2D vector with the origin as the “F” key on the keyboard. Aggregating all
the key-press locations will yield the point cloud as discussed earlier.
4.4.1.1 Key-Press Timing
The intuition to detect key-presses is rooted in the hand’s motion in the vertical
direction. When the finger dips while typing a key, the wrist also undergoes a
partial dipping motion, expected to reflect in the Z-axis of the watch. Figure 4.8
shows an example of the Z-axis motion when the user types the word “admin-
istrative”. Using ground truth, we observe that the actual key-presses generally
produce prominent peaks, however, false positives and false negatives occur.
False positives occur mainly during transition from one key to another – the
hand moves up slightly to make the movement, which manifests in Z-axis mo-
tion. False negatives typically arise due to subtle Z-axis motion for keys like
“asdf” that can go undetected.
To cope with these issues, we use bagged decision trees to classify keystrokes.
A bagged decision tree is an ensemble classifier that trains multiple decision
trees by selecting different subsets of feature and training examples. The clas-
sifier improves the stability and accuracy by letting each subtree learn on the
attacker’s labeled data, applies the learning to the unlabeled data, and then
computes the final results via voting. To obtain the labeled data, we first apply a
simple threshold-based peak detection method [90] on the Z-axis acceleration,
and label true/false detection on the attacker’s template. We purposely set the
peak detection threshold to be low so that we do not miss true keystrokes. Then
we extract features within a time window around the labels and train the clas-
sifier.
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The feature set includes: the width, height, prominence of the Z-axis peak;
the mean, variance, max, min, skewness, and kurtosis for each of the three-axis
displacement, velocity, acceleration, and gyroscope rotation; the magnitude of
acceleration/gyroscope; and finally the correlation of each pair between accel-
eration and gyroscope vectors. When the attackee’s sensor data arrives, we ap-
ply the same peak detection scheme and obtain many candidate keystrokes
and their features. Then the classifier identifies the validity of the keystroke
and selects the max value of Z-axis acceleration to denote the timing of the
key-press. Figure 4.9 shows an example of the classification result of the word
“administrative”.
Figure 4.10 shows the detection rate for each key-press when using one au-
thor’s template model to test on eight different volunteers recruited in Section
4.5.1 (and ground truth recorded by the keyboard logger software). Expectedly,
the keys pressed by the right hand are largely undetected.
4.4.1.2 Key-Press Location Estimation
The core challenge here pertains to tracking the hand motion as it moves from
one key to another, and from there, inferring the location of each key-press.
Tracking over time is non-trivial since the required accuracy is high (in the gran-
ularity of key sizes); moreover, incorrect detection of one key will affect subse-
quent results. The hope we have is that the the left index finger periodically
moves back to the home key “F”, and hence, it is an opportunity to recalibrate
the tracking process at the start and end of a sequence of typed characters.
As a first cut, we used the linear acceleration (offered by the native Android
API) to compute displacement. We applied established double integration and
mean removal techniques. Figure 4.11 compares the X displacement com-
puted by Android API and MoLe, against ground truth (available from the cam-
era). The errors proved inadequate for our purposes. Hence, we developed an
improved tracking technique tailored to the MoLe application. We define each
of the steps below.
1. Find gravity to define an absolute coordinate system. Before the at-
tacker (or attackee) starts to type, his or her hand is stable. We use this
opportunity to estimate the direction of gravity in the watch’s coordinate
system, and we can then estimate the orthogonal plane, which is the ab-
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solute horizontal plane. We then project the watch’s X-axis to the abso-
lute horizontal plane to get the absolute X-axis. Since the absolute Z-axis
is essentially along the direction of gravity, the cross product of the Z-
axis and X-axis yields the absolute Y-axis. Here, C = (X ,Y , Z ) is the ab-
solute coordinate system (represented by the watch’s coordinate system).
Of course, since the wrist orientation changes during typing, this repre-
sentation changes as well. Thus, at the starting point, we represent the
absolute coordinates as C (0)= (X (0),Y (0), Z (0)).
2. Estimate and remove gravity. From the gyroscope, we estimate the ro-
tation matrix over time R(t ) and use it to estimate the variation in the
watch’s gravity g (t ), in the watch’s coordinate system. We sample accel-
eration a(t ) in the watch’s coordinate system and it is polluted by gravity.
Now we remove gravity and get ar g (t )= a(t )− g (t ).
3. Estimate C (t ) and calculate the projected acceleration. Note that di-
rectly integrating ar g (t ) has no physical meaning even if gravity has al-
ready been removed. This is because ar g (t ) is along the watch’s axes and
the watch rotates overtime. Ideally, we want to integrate along the fixed
directions of the absolute coordinate system. Those directions are X (t ),
Y (t ) and Z (t ) mentioned before in C (t ). We can get C (t ) with the help
of the rotation matrix R(t ). Thus, a′r g (t ) can be obtained by projecting
ar g (t ) to X (t ), Y (t ) and Z (t ). Integrating a′r g (t ) now yields the speed
v ′(t ), and integrating v ′(t ) ultimately returns the displacement s′(t ).
4. Calibrate by mean removal (speed and displacement). Of course, this
is erroneous, however, if we know that at time T , v ′(T ) = 0 and s′(T ) = 0
(i.e., the watch has come to a stop), we can refine the estimates of speed
and displacement by mean removal.
5. Perform Kalman smoothing. The displacement estimation is still not
stable, and occasionally the result becomes poor. We carefully checked
the data and detected that gravity estimation is not entirely reliable.
Thus, we apply a Kalman smoothing to a′r g (t ) to estimate the gravity es-
timation error g ′e (t ). The idea is to think about a′r g (t ) as g ′e (t ) plus noise,
where noise is generated due to the act of typing. We set a large noise
parameter in Kalman smoothing such that the Kalman smoothing output
does not closely follow a′r g (t ), but it shows the underlying shifting trend
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hidden in a′r g (t ). Now, we refine a′r g (t ) to a′r g (t )−g ′e (t ). The performance
improves consistently.
Figure 4.12 plots the final result comparison between MoLe and the original
Android API method. It is clear that MoLe provides better watch displacement
estimation.
4.4.2 Point Cloud Fitting
From the estimated displacements for each key, MoLe generates a unlabeled
point cloud (UPC) for the attackee. Since the points in this UPC are not labeled,
we fit the attacker’s character point cloud (CPC) to the UPC. The key intuition is
that the relative motions between keys (reflected in the relative locations of the
point clouds) should bear similarity across all users. To achieve this fitting, we
compute the convex hulls for the CPC and the UPC.
Observing that the fitting parameters for up and down hand displacements
can be different, we compute two convex hulls for the CPC – one for all the pos-
itive X displacements (denoted by HC PCpos ) and the other for all the negative X
displacements (denoted by HC PCneg ). Similarly, we compute two convex hulls for
the UPC – HU PCpos and H
U PC
neg . We fit H
C PC
pos to H
U PC
pos and H
C PC
neg to H
U PC
neg respec-
tively.
To fit a convex hull H1 to another convex hull H2, we first calculate their cords
C1 and C2 which originate from the origin and pass through their centroids.
Then, we (1) rotate H1 such that C1 aligns with C2, (2) scale H1 in the direction
of C1 such that C1 equals to C2, and (3) scale H1 in the orthogonal direction of
C1 such that the area of H1 equals to that of H2. Figure 4.13 shows an example
of point cloud fitting.
The metric for fitting is defined by the degree of overlap between the CPC and
UPC convex hulls. More precisely, we compute the ratio of the intersection and
union of the convex hulls.
An attacker might be able to generate multiple CPCs, perhaps from her ac-
complices. MoLe performs the fitting for each of these CPCs and selects the
one that maximizes the intersection/union ratio. The rotated and scaled CPC
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is now superimposed on the UPC and a framework is ready to estimate labels
for each point in the UPC.
4.4.3 Bayesian Inference
Even if the keystroke detection and point cloud fitting are perfect, MoLe still
does not know the characters typed by the right hand. Thus, as a first step, we
attempt to fill in these “holes” to infer the complete word. The rather obvious
step is to calculate the posterior probability of each word in the English dictio-
nary, given the motion inferences from the left hand. The words corresponding
to the top-K highest probabilities can be enumerated as candidates. We apply
Bayes’ theorem formulated as:
P (W |O)=
P (O |W )P (W )
P (O)
(4.1)
where
• W is a candidate word from the dictionary and O is the observation mo-
tion data.
• P (W |O) is the posterior probability of the word given the observed mo-
tion data.
• P (O|W ) is the likelihood function that estimates the probability of the
word W based on the observed motion data.
• P (W ) is the prior probability which captures the word’s occurrence fre-
quency.
• P (O) is the probability of the observation.
Since P (O) is the same for all possible words, we are only interested in calcu-
lating P (O|W ) and P (W ). That is,
P (W |O) ∝ P (O |W ) × P (W ) (4.2)
P (W ) can be obtained from a contemporary English corpus. In the current
experiment, we assume P (W ) is equal among words, meaning each word has
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the same occurrence frequency. The key goal translates to obtaining the maxi-
mum (or high) values of the likelihood P (O|W ). In the following, we present a
few opportunities to refine the likelihood function and the posterior probabil-
ity.
Step 1: Using the Number of Keystrokes Our first intuition is simply to em-
ploy the number of detected keystrokes as observations to match the word. The
keystroke detector gives us the number of keys typed by the left hand and this
number is used to match each word. For example, when two keys are detected,
matching the word “the” produces higher likelihood than the word “teacher”,
because the number of peaks generated while typing “the” is much closer to
two than “teacher”. Now, for each of the detected keystroke, we would like
to match them with the characters in the word. Since the keystroke could be
caused by any characters in the word, we need to consider all possible assign-
ments.
To calculate P(O | W), we can write
P (O |W )= P (N |W )= ∑
(α1,...,αN )
P ((cα1 , ...,cαN ) |W ) (4.3)
where N is the number of keystrokes and (α1, ...,αN ) represents one possible
N -element combination from {1,2, ...,L} and L is the word length. The sum-
mation adds up all possible combinations. Here, ci is the i th character in W ;
P ((cα1 , ...,cαN ) |W ) is the probability that N peaks are generated by cα1 , ...,cαN .
For instance, let us assume two keystrokes are detected and we want to cal-
culate the likelihood of the word “the” by using the keystroke detector result in
Figure 4.10.
P (O = 2 |W = "the")= 0.986∗0.035∗0.119 (cα1 = t ;cα2 = h)
+0.986∗0.965∗0.881 (cα1 = t ;cα2 = e)
+0.014∗0.035∗0.881 (cα1 = h;cα2 = e)
= 0.84
In the above equation, 0.119 means the probability that “e” is not detected
and equals to (1−0.881). In a similar way, we calculate the probability that “t”
is not detected (0.014) and “h” is detected (0.035).
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Thus, by iterating over all words in the dictionary, we can obtain the likeli-
hood for each word. Of course, further refinements are possible.
Step 2: Consecutive Characters In some cases, our key-press timing module
detects only one keystroke for two consecutive characters such as “er”, “sa” or
“re”. These keys are adjacent on the keyboard, and the watch dips in so close
succession that they are not separable. Therefore, we treat these character
pairs as one key. Figure 4.14 shows the experimental results that these com-
mon character–pairs are detected as zero, one, or two key-presses. Evidently,
treating them as a single key-press should be appropriate in a majority of the
cases.
Step 3: Adding Watch Displacement MoLe is now ready to leverage the ac-
tual watch displacement. Assuming fingers are placed over the home position
(“F” and “J”), recall that the key-press location estimation module computes
the location of each key-press (Figure 4.4). Of course, the estimated location is
not accurate due to the noise in the hardware, minute differences in the hand
motions, minute differences in hand’s 2D orientation, etc. However, given that
the CPC has been fitted to the user’s UPC, it is now possible to better predict
the word by taking displacement into consideration. Thus, Equation 4.3 can be
rewritten as:
P (O |W )
= P (N ∩di , i = 1,2, ..., N |W )
= ∑
(α1,...,αN )
P ((cαi , ...,cαN ) |W )p((d1, ...,dN ) | (cαi , ...,cαN ),W )
(4.4)
where p((d1, ...,dN ) | (cαi , ...,cαN ),W ) is probability density of typing cα1 , ...,cαN
of W at character displacements d1, ...,dN , and di is the i th character displace-
ment in W .
MoLe models each character’s location as a Gaussian distribution. Assuming
the distribution of displacement di only depends on current character cαi , we
simplify Equation 4.4 as:
P (O |W )= ∑
(α1,...,αN )
P ((cα1 , ...,cαN ) |W )
N∏
i=1
p(di | cαi ) (4.5)
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where p(di | cαi ) is probability density of di given character cαi .
Step 4: Character Transitions We assumed above that each character dis-
placement is independent. However, typing a word consists of sequential
movements and the current displacement is indeed influenced by the loca-
tion of the previous character. Figure 4.15 illustrates an example in which we
compare the displacement of “a” when the previous character is “v” versus “r”.
Clearly, the distributions are different. For “ra”, the displacement of typing “a”
is shifted toward the position of character “r” because the little finger types “a”
right after “r”, before returning to home position. For “va”, the displacement of
“a” is clearly close to “v”, because of the same reason.
Given this observation, we extend the likelihood function to the following:
P (O |W )≈ ∑
(α1,...,αN )
P ((cα1 , ...,cαN ) |W )
N∏
i=1
p(di | cαi ,cαi−1 ) (4.6)
Now the displacement probability density p(di | cαi ,cαi−1 ) not only considers
cαi but also the previous character cαi−1 .
Step 5: Keystroke Interval Timing of the key-presses on the left hand should
also encode information about missing keys. We ask, given the time detected
interval between consecutive keystrokes, what the probability is that there are
N right-hand characters between them. Correct guesses of N can obviously
help. For example, when typing the word “t h a n k s” (characters typed by the
left hand are underlined), the observed interval between “t” and “a” may be
expectedly shorter than between “a” and “s”.
Figure 4.16 plots the distribution of time intervals for increasing lengths of
character sequences. These sequences consists of right-hand characters in the
middle and are surrounded by two left-hand characters. Unsurprisingly, the
time interval generally increases with the number of keystrokes. However, we
observe high variance. For example, even though the segment “-b i l i t-” and
“-t i o n a-” both have three right-hand characters in the middle, the average
interval of “-t i o n a-” is shorter than “-b i l i t-” due to hand geometry and
typing familiarity.
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Therefore, for better timing observation, we should obtain the time interval
distribution of every possible character-sequence that is preceded and followed
by two left-hand characters, and use this distribution in the Bayesian model.
The observation can be written into
P (O |W )
= P (N ∩di , i = 1,2, ..., N ∩ t j , j = 1,2, ..., N −1 |W )
≈ ∑
(α1,...,αN )
P ((cα1 , ...,cαN ) |W )
N∏
i=1
p(di | cαi ,cαi−1 )p((t1, ..., tN−1)
| (cα1 , ...,cαN ), (d1, ...,dN ),W )
(4.7)
where N −1 interval distributions, t j with j = 1,2, ..., N −1, are added into the
observation. Note that the attacker and attackee are typing at slightly different
speeds. MoLe compensates this speed bias with a factor k, calculated from the
ratio of attacker to attackee’s average typing interval.
4.5 Evaluation
4.5.1 Data Collection and Methodology
MoLe has been implemented on the Galaxy Gear Live smartwatch, which runs
the latest Android Wear platform. When activated, the MoLe client on the watch
continuously logs accelerometer and gyroscope readings at 200 Hz, along with
timestamps. The sensor data is stored locally during data collection and trans-
ferred to the backend (MATLAB) server for analysis.
MoLe is evaluated with eight subjects, recruited by advertising about these
experiments in the university campus. The subjects were offered an incen-
tive of $10 per hour, and each subject invited to our lab for a two-hour session.
All subjects were familiar with English typing (five are native English speakers,
three are females). Each subject was asked to type 300 English words randomly
selected from 5000 most frequently used words [89]. The word length ranged
from 1 to 14, and was equally distributed. In total, we test 2400 words across all
users.
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Each subject was seated at a desk in front of a Lenovo laptop. Our experiment
GUI popped up one word at a time on the laptop screen, and the volunteer’s
task was to type the same word in a text box on the screen. If any of the char-
acter is incorrectly typed, we discard the data and let the subject re-enter the
word. Between each word recording, we ask the subjects to initialize their hand
position on “F” and “J”. During the typing, the laptop was also programmed to
record the timing of the keystroke, which will later serve as ground truth. To
collect the offline training data, two of the authors (pretending to be attack-
ers) performed the same procedure, but with the top-500 longest words in the
dictionary. Long words help capture the diversity of the typing patterns. The
whole data collection is done on a Lenovo ThinkPad equipped with a regular
full-sized keyboard.
For full ground truth recording, we mount an Android Samsung Galaxy S4
phone on top of the keyboard and use the front camera to capture the video
of hand movement. We apply the camera calibration toolbox in Matlab [91] to
calibrate the camera pixel, and measure the watch distance and location from
each frame (Figure 4.1).
4.5.2 Performance Results
The following questions are of interest in this section:
• How well can MoLe guess each word (i.e., in an ordered list of guesses by
MoLe, what is the rank of the actual word)?
• What factors affect this rank?
• How do different opportunities contribute toward overall performance?
• How can we prevent the threat introduced by MoLe ?
• Does the type of keyboard matter?
• Can humans guess better by looking at a sequence of candidate guesses?
4.5.2.1 How Well Can MoLe Guess Each Word?
Figure 4.17 plots the CDF of rank, computed from each of the 2400 words typed
by the subjects of the experiments. The average across all eight subjects is
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shown in black, while MoLe’s performance for each individual subject shown
in gray. We observe that the median rank of a word is 24, while for 30th per-
centile, the rank is 5. Put differently, when a user types a word, there is a 30%
chance that MoLe would narrow down the typed word to only five possibilities,
and a 50% chance to only 24 possibilities. Given that 5000 words are possible,
this is an appreciable reduction of the search space, and makes it amenable to
brute-force attacks.
Figure 4.18 plots the ranks of typed words for each test subject. The ranks
are generally higher (i.e., MoLe’s guesses are better) for subjects S2, S5, and S8.
On examining the video and sensor traces for these subjects, we find that they
have lower variance in their hand movements, probably because they type as
per the prescribed guidelines. We also test the case with perfect key-press de-
tection (i.e., using the actual number and timing of keystrokes only from the
left hand, gathered from the ground truth timing information recorded during
the experiments). Surprisingly, the 30th percentile drops sharply to 1, meaning
that MoLe can exactly guess the word; the 50th percentile drops to 6. Clearly,
further improvements in key-press detection is the key to improving MoLe.
4.5.2.2 What Factors Affect the Rank?
Figure 4.19 plots the median rank of words for increasing word lengths. The
rank generally decreases with word length greater than 6, primarily because (1)
there is a greater number of keystrokes that gets detected in a longer word, and
(2) because the number of words of that length reduces, in turn reducing the
number of words it can be confused with. Words of length 4 to 7 on the other
hand, have fewer keystrokes; also, there are many more words of such lengths,
adding to the difficulty of detection.
Figure 4.20 shows the number of left-hand characters in a word. With an
increasing number of left-hand characters, MoLe naturally gains richer infor-
mation about the word, ultimately improving its ability to guess. When a word
contains more than five left-hand characters, MoLe is able to bring down the
rank below 20. When the number of left-hand characters is two to four, per-
formance degrades because a large number of words have the same two-four
left-hand characters in them.
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4.5.2.3 Impact of Each Bayesian Opportunity
Section 4.4.3 leveraged a number of opportunities under the Bayesian model.
Figure 4.21 shows the break-down of contributions from each of them. Using
only the number of detected keystrokes (step 1 and 2 in Section 4.4.3), MoLe
performs rather poorly on the dataset. When the displacement information is
added (step 3 and 4), MoLe improves the rank from 340 to 49 at 50th percentile.
Finally, when time interval is incorporated (step 5), the median rank improves
from 49 to 24.
4.5.2.4 Impact of Sampling Rate
Figure 4.22 characterizes the impact of sensor sampling rate (200 Hz, 100 Hz,
50 Hz, 20 Hz) on the median rank of words for all of the subjects. Evidently,
MoLe’s ability to guess degrades drastically with lower sampling rates – median
ranking falls as 64, 141 and 1218. Perhaps this could be a way to mitigate the
attack through smartwatches. A typing classifier could first detect whether the
user is typing, and if so, the sampling rate of the sensor data can be diminished
to less than 50 Hz.
4.5.2.5 Keyboard Variant
The difference in the shape of desktop and laptop keyboards may translate to
decoding errors with MoLe. To test this, subject S5 was asked to repeat the same
data collection process on a desktop keyboard. Figure 4.23 plots a histogram of
the rank differences of each word, when decoded from the two keyboards. We
notice that 45.2% of rank differences are less than 10. More specifically, the
laptop keyboard presents a median rank of 10 and 30th percentile rank of 4.
The computer keyboard’s median rank is 14 and 30th percentile rank is still at 4.
The results show that the system performance is close between two keyboards,
even though the attackers used the laptop keyboard for training the system. If the
attackers generated models from various keyboards, and applied the best one
during the keystroke detector and cloud fitting process, the results can be even
better.
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4.5.2.6 Recovery via Human Observation
Although MoLe is not able to detect spaces and separate the words at this mo-
ment, we are interested to know how the threat would become even worse if
this limitation is relaxed. To this end, we ask subject S5 to enter (one-by-one)
the words from an actual sentence. Table 4.1 shows MoLe’s end-to-end predic-
tion result for each of the words in the sentence (which contains eight words).
For each word, the top-5 guesses are listed from top to down. As would be ex-
pected, the words in each column bear similarity in the character sequences
embedded in them. For example, W6 typically starts with “t” or “th” and W8
contains many left-hand characters. We present this table to colleagues in our
department and most of them could recover the sentence in a few minutes.
We encourage the readers to reconstruct sentence on their own – the answer is
made available at end of the Chapter 4.2
4.6 Points of Discussion
We discuss a few limitations and opportunities for improvement.
Confined to Separate Words MoLe is not yet a real-world attack since it is not
able to detect the space bar and separate out words from a sentence. Also, with-
out any priors on digit sequences, it is difficult to detect what digits users are
typing. Additional work is necessary to further separate out these keystrokes.
However, we believe there is opportunity. We have found early evidence that
the magnetic field on the keyboard is quite telling of the position of the wrist.
With some signal processing, the magnetic field may offer valuable hints on
how the wrist is moving and when it is coming back to its original position. We
leave this to future work.
Applying Nature Language Processing To recover the whole sentence, tech-
niques from nature language processing (NLP) may also apply. For example, we
can apply N-gram language models which predict the N th word given a previ-
ous N −1 word sequence. Thus, even if a few words have low accuracy in the
sentence, it may still be possible to infer the sentence, or even the broad se-
mantic content.
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Typing Activity Classifier In a real-world attack, we would first need to sub-
ject the sensor data to a classifier which will output whether the user is typ-
ing or not. Only when the user is known to be typing, should MoLe be applied
on the data. We have not developed a “typing or not” detector in this chapter,
but believe that it can be developed (perhaps from the orientation of the watch
and the slight back-and-forth movement). Also, we need to be able to identify
whether the watch is worn on the left or right hand, which remains for future
work.
4.7 Related Work
We categorize this section into inferring keystrokes on traditional computer
keyboards and sensor information leaks on smart devices.
Inferring Keystrokes on Computer Keyboards Many researches have at-
tempted to infer keystrokes on computer keyboards. Various modalities
have been leveraged, such as acoustics signal [92, 93], input timing analy-
sis [94, 95, 96], RF radio [97], and electromagnetic emanations [98]. These
researches have successfully delivered high-accuracy results. However, none
of them use motion sensor data; also, to intercept physical signals and decode
the data, these methods are typically required to install additional hardware or
software, which make them somewhat difficult to widely deploy the attacks. In
contrast, MoLe can be launched with ease on top of commericially available
wearable devices. Marquardt et al. demonstrated the (Sp)iPhone [99] and
showed that it is possible to use the accelerometer on an iPhone to recover
text entered on a keyboard when the phone is placed nearby, on the same
table surface. Both (Sp)iPhone and MoLe exploit side channels, however, MoLe
uses the wrist motion data in 3D, which differs from the surface vibrations in
(Sp)iPhone.
Sensor Information Leaks on Smart Devices Researchers have studied side
channel attacks to infer keystrokes on smartphones and tablets [100, 101, 102,
103]. The core idea behind these works is that when typing on different loca-
tions on a virtual keyboard, the keystrokes cause distinct vibrations/rotations.
The motion data on smartphones can thus be used to infer the tapped loca-
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tion. TouchLogger [101] and accessory [100] are the early works, and use an
accelerometer only to infer tap location on screen. Cai et al. [102] and Miluzzo
et al. [103] advance the technique to infer keystrokes and show that a gyroscope
has better accuracy than accelerometer-based inference. MoLe bears similarity
in that it is also a side channel attack. However, there are two main differences.
First, the above works are feature-based. They design features to capture dis-
tinct screen motions caused by the touches and train models with these fea-
tures to infer the touch positions. In contrast, since smartwatch is on the user’s
wrist, we track the movement of the wrist to infer what the user has typed. Sec-
ond, we are only able to sense partial keystrokes with one hand, as well as indi-
rect data of the wrist. To recover the whole input word, MoLe must rely much
more strongly on the Bayesian models. GyroPhone [104] presents a new type of
threat to intercept human speech by using a gyroscope on a smartphone. The
authors found that the MEMS gyro sensors are able to pick up air vibrations
from sound at low frequency. MoLe is still different since it attempts to extract
semantic understanding of the human’s hand motions.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates that sensor data from smartwatches can leak in-
formation about what the user is typing on a regular (laptop or desktop) key-
board. By processing the accelerometer and gyroscope signals, tracking the
wrist micro-motions, and combining them with the structure of valid English
words, reasonable guesses can be made about typed words. Given the excite-
ment around a smartwatch app store, such an attack can severely penetrate
into the private lives of humans. While we find that diminishing the sampling
rate of the accelerometer and gyroscope can alleviate the attack, we believe
additional side channels like magnetic field variations need to be carefully in-
vestigated. Otherwise, wearable devices could soon become a “double-edged
sword” slowing down future innovations on this platform.
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4.9 Figures
Watch&Coordinate&
Figure 4.1: Watch coordinate system and ground truth measurement by
recording hand typing with a smartphone camera view.
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FT T
F F
T
Figure 4.2: Three video frames show the process of typing “T” from “F”.
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Figure 4.3: The watch X-axis displacements while a human types 20
characters. In the figures, X-axis is time in seconds and Y-axis is watch X-axis
displacement in millimeter. The gray bar shows the keystroke press and
release time interval.
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Figure 4.4: Watch 2D displacements while a human types 20 characters with
the left hand. Each character is typed repeatedly five times. (0,0) is the initial
location when left-hand fingers are placed on home position (“asdf”). Note
that X-axis and Y-axis in the graph are in the watch’s coordinate system.
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of typing “teacher” continuously (in black) against
each character separately (in gray). Note that the positions of “e”, “a” and “c”
are away from their original points due to sequential typing. Also, “h” is not
captured due to right-hand typing.
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Figure 4.6: System overview: The typed data from users is pre-processed
through gravity removal and timing analysis blocks, superimposed on the
refitted typing templates, and passed through a Bayesian inference model that
leverages the patterns and structures in English words to ultimately decode
the typed words. Note that training is only required from the attacker’s end; no
training is needed for the user.
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Figure 4.7: Character point cloud computed from attacker’s data and
unlabeled point cloud computed from user’s data.
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Figure 4.8: A simple peak detection scheme to detect keystrokes. The left Y-axis
represents acceleration and the right Y-axis indicates displacement. Note that
for “a”,“d”,“s” keystrokes, lower Z-axis acceleration is generated because of the
left hand’s initial position. At time 2.7 and 3 seconds, there are two false
detections due to the left hand moving from “a” to “t” and from “t” to “v”.
135
Time in Seconds
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Ac
ce
le
ra
tio
n 
(m
/s2
)
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
a d m i ni s t ra t i v e
D
is
pl
ac
em
en
t (c
m)
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Z-axis linear accerlation
keystroke
non-keystoke
X-axis displacement
Figure 4.9: Bagged decision classification results: A peak detection tool with
low thresholds is first applied to the Z-axis acceleration data and marks
potential keystrokes (both yellow triangles and green circles). The classifier
then identifies whether the peaks are keystrokes or not. Note that for the first
“a” and “d”, since two peaks are too close, the classifier would identify only one
peak with the highest Z-axis acceleration within a time window.
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Figure 4.11: Comparison of MoLe and Android API X-axis displacement
results. The Y-axis has similar results but is omitted due to space.
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Figure 4.12: Comparison of MoLe and Android API displacement results.
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Figure 4.13: Point cloud fitting. Black points are the CPC attacker template
and gray points are UPC from the attackee. (a) Find each convex hull. (b)
Calculate the centroids and perform rotating and scaling. (c) Point cloud
fitting result.
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Figure 4.15: Comparison of “a” displacement while the previous character is
“v” or “r”. The key locations of v and r are marked in the figure.
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Figure 4.18: Rank of average, across users and with perfect key-press detection.
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Figure 4.19: Median rank plotted against increasing word length – words of
length 4 to 7 show the worst performance due to fewer keys to be detected
while such words occur in large numbers.
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Figure 4.20: Variation of rank against the number of characters typed by the
left hand.
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Figure 4.22: Lower sensor sampling rate rapidly reduces the ability to guess the
word, perhaps indicating a way to thwart MoLe’s attack.
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Figure 4.23: A histogram shows the rank difference of each word between two
keyboards. The trend indicates that most words have a similar rank, so the
difference is low.
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4.10 Tables
Table 4.1: Can you guess the correct sentence? The words (W1-W8) in each
column are ranked in decreasing order of probability. Note that some words
may not feature in the top-5 words presented in each column. The answer is
made available at end of the Chapter 4.2
Rank W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8
1. motor pistol profound technology angel those that disappear
2. monitor list journalism remaining spray today tight discourse
3. them but originally telephone super third tightly secondary
4. the lost original meanwhile fire through thirty adviser
5. then most profile headline shore towel truth discover
2“The most profound technologies are those that disappear” - Mark Weiser, 1991
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Mobile devices are becoming a sensing and computing lens for society. Human
behavior manifests in these sensing dimensions and we think it is possible to
measure human behavior through motion data processing. Our research has
focused on designing sensing and inferencing techniques, with an emphasis
on location sensing and tracking.
We investigated the benefits of fusing smartphone sensors into the indoor
localization framework. Results from UnLoc suggest indoor environments are
rich in landmarks. These landmarks can be sensed by smartphones and located
using noisy sensor data, ultimately improving localization performance. Con-
tinuing with the goal of indoor localization, we proposed a different point in the
design landscape, VideoLoc, where feeds from surveillance cameras were inte-
grated with smartphone sensors to offer highly precise localization. We also
conducted research on micro-scale tracking of the human wrist and demon-
strated that motion data processing is a “double-edged sword” – it offers value
but also reveals incredible details about people’s lives.
In the future, we plan to spend several more years on this theme, but broad-
ening to various other sensing dimensions and applications. More specifically,
we plan to do both bottom-up and top-down research. In the bottom-up re-
search, we plan to develop deeper inferencing techniques beyond motion sen-
sors and include cameras, sound, and wireless signals, in a way that the whole
is greater than the sum of parts. In a second thread of top-down research, we
plan to build systems and applications that utilize these inference techniques.
Our current interests are in mobile health, smart cities, vehicular analytics and
others, essentially trying to expose human behavior to various decision-making
processes. Take mobile health as an example. The load on the healthcare sys-
tem is growing tremendously. Sensing and inference technology, situated in-
side the home or on the body, would have to be harnessed to perform triage.
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To this end, we will focus on various forms of activity and gesture recognition,
as well as “change point detection” algorithms to identify when the important
medical changes are occurring. We believe that the healthcare system of tomor-
row will have to develop a bridge between physical hospitals and the context of
the home – our research will help in building this bridge.
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